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ABSTRACT
This study evaluates the successes and failures of the 
North Carolina Loyalists during the American Revolution.
It traces their fate froman initial disaster at the Battle 
of Moore’s Creek Bridge in 1776, through the four years of 
Whig hegemony that followed, to the dramatic climax of 
Loyalist hopes during the British invasion of the state in 
1781. Throughout these years, the Whigs and Tories of 
North Carolina were locked in a deadly civil war, the 
outcome of which was not certain until over a year after 
the British surrender at Yorktown.
This study utilizes the writings of both factions, 
including Loyalist chieftain David Fanning and Whig 
moderate James Iredell. The letters of British officers 
and statesmen reflect their frustration in coordinating 
British troops with Crown supporters. The Moravian diaries 
and minutes of the Whig provincial congresses and courts 
provide insight into the Whigs' struggle to maintain law 
and order. Finally, the army of historians who have 
grappled with the Loyalist dilemma help to narrate the 
events of the Revolutionary War in North Carolina and 
interpret the role that the Loyalists played in shaping 
these events.
The North Carolina Loyalists failed to control their 
own state because they were outnumbered and lacked strong 
leadership. Like Loyalists throughout British North 
America, they suffered from the inherent disadvantage of 
trying to preserve an extremely unpopular status quo. The 
Loyalists’ only hope was a massive and swift British 
offensive coordinated with their own Tory units, but 
sporadic and meager support from the British war machine 
doomed Loyalist attempts at winning control of the state. 
Finally, the Whig government in North Carolina was 
successful in maintaining a respectable amount of law and 
order and held out the alluring promise of peace and 
stability for the war-torn state.
v
3the North Carolina Loyalists acted hastily and suffered 
from mediocre leadership. Ironically, the ultimate failure 
of the campaign reinforced British belief that the southern 
Loyalists could become a viable force when coordinated with 
British regulars.2 The two men responsible for the 
southern expedition were later to become intimately 
associated with plans to use Loyalists. Lord George 
Germain guided the strategy from Whitehall and demanded 
complete colonial submission. Gen. Henry Clinton was 
appointed by Gen. Sir William Howe in January 1776 to take 
charge of the campaign's land forces. He was to become 
commander in chief in North America two years later. Both 
Germain and Clinton failed to distinguish themselves in
this expedition.3
In October 1775, General Howe received detailed 
instructions. The campaign included ten thousand stands of 
arms for the Loyalists and seven regiments transported by a 
naval convoy commanded by Sir Peter Parker. December 1, 
1775, was the departure date for the convoy. It was to 
sail from Ireland to the Cape Fear River, North Carolina, 
where it was to be joined by a smaller force under Clinton 
from Boston. Whatever number of Loyalists gathered by 
Governor Martin would also be utilized. Governor Campbell 
of South Carolina and Southern Indian Superintendent John 
Stuart would also join the forces.^ The Carolina Whigs 
would be crushed, the Loyalists would restore royal
4authority, and the redcoats would move into other 
disaffected areas.
Although timing was crucial, the troops from Ireland 
did not depart until February 13, 1776, and several vessels 
had to return to port after stormy weather. High winds and 
heavy seas plagued the voyage, and the first of the 
battered ships limped into the Cape Fear anchorage on April 
18. The entire fleet was not assembled until May 3. 
Charles Stedman, commissary for the British army, arrived a 
few weeks after the disaster at Moore's Creek Bridge. He 
recalled that the troops from Ireland were so tardy that 
"no time could be spared sufficiently to make a proper 
trial of the affections of any of the p r o v i n c e s " .5
The frigate Mercury, the armed sloop Scorpion and 
three transports under Clinton departed Boston on January 
20. On board were two companies of light infantry and some 
Scottish Highlanders. The latter were a recruiting tool 
for the Scotch living along the Cape Fear. The convoy 
arrived on March 12, only to be greeted with the news of 
the defeat at Moore's Creek Bridge. Whig intelligence had 
sounded the alarm early. On February 17, the Pennsylvania 
Evening Post reported that "twenty-five transports, with 
four thousand troops on board," had sailed from Ireland for 
America. Three days later, more information revealed that 
the convoy was "to rendezvous in Virginia, and a part or 
all of the forces to proceed to South C a r o l i n a " . 6
5Charles Stedman outlined the Loyalist phase of the 
expedition. "The Highlanders were to march down the Cape 
Fear to Wilmington, where they were to be met by the king's 
troops, and such vessels of war, of easy draught of water, 
as could come up there."7 Since Governor Martin later 
reported that Whig control of the colony extended one 
hundred miles inland, Germain directed Clinton not to make 
North Carolina the focus of operations. The primary 
purpose of the expedition remained the same: to assemble 
and arm Loyalists. To appease Martin, the British command 
promised him command of any provincial corps that might be 
formed and to receive the pay of a British colonel.&
Governor Martin's responsibility for recruiting 
Loyalists was no easy task. He had been instructed to send 
"emissaries amongst the Inhabitants of the well-disposed 
Counties with authority and commissions". The crown would
supply them with arms and the same pay as the regular
troops, and they would be "liberally paid" for horses and
wagons they brought with them. Further, the troops would
not be obliged to serve out of the province without their 
consent, all arrears of quit rents would be cancelled, and 
grants of land were made according to rank and merit, with 
all grants rent-free for twenty years.9 That less than 
1,600 men out of a total provincial population of 
approximately 180,000 enlisted under these terms points to 
some grave deficiencies in Tory popular support.10
6On January 10, 1776, one week after the outline of the 
expedition reached Martin, he issued a proclamation calling 
upon all royal subjects to unite, and declared the royal 
standard raised in North Carolina. Loyalist leaders in 
eight counties were given the authority to commission 
officers, recruit militias, seize rebel arms and "impress 
all necessary provisions and transportation resources". A 
rendezvous was to occur no later than February 15. Clinton 
and Lt. Gen. Charles Lord Cornwallis, commander of the 
troops sailing from Ireland, were scheduled to be off the 
Cape Fear by then.H With effective British assistance 
still months away however, the rendezvous would be 
premature. A former military man, Martin should have 
understood the precarious timetables of eighteenth century 
warfare and avoided over-reliance on the timely arrival of 
redcoats. Stedman claimed that it was "necessary to embody 
the Loyalists, as the only chance of keeping them steady in 
their intentions".12
Perhaps if the British command and even Governor 
Martin had better understood the motivations of the North 
Carolina Loyalists they could have galvanized them into 
action more effectively early in the war.The peculiar 
social environment of North Carolina presented a challenge 
to both the Whig and Tory leaders who recruited armed 
support. According to historians Michael Kay and William 
Price, war or the the threat of war affected the everyday
7lives of North Carolinians because of the "greater 
frequency and geographical proximity of wars, as well as 
the continuous and distinctive fears of the colonists for 
the Indians in the west and the slaves within". 
Nonetheless, their willingness to enlist in active military 
service was "quite another matter". Surveyor William
Byrd II described North Carolina as an isolated, 
"undifferentiated wilderness inhabited by uncivilized 
rustics," who paid "no tribute to God or Caesar".^ 
Geographical conditions contributed to the isolation of 
widely separated communities. Some of the factors were 
shallow rivers, poor harbors, numerous swamps and the slick 
red clay roads.
North Carolina had experienced tremendous internal 
strife and political disorder in the colonial period. The 
Anglican establishment was weak. The crown's involvement 
after the colony came under royal authority in 1729 was 
generally negative, and the personalities of many of the 
governors were at best disruptive.15 The legitimacy of 
provincial authority was often challenged, most notably
during the Regulator Movement from 1766 to 1771. According
to historian Roger Ekirch, "North Carolina's role in the
American Revolution was shaped by the still-rumbling waves 
of Regulator turbulence".16
The Regulation, an organized movement of white
farmers, swept the western counties of Orange, Anson, and
8Rowan from 1766 until 1771. The farmers used political 
pressure to democratize local government. They brought law 
suits, presented petitions to the governor, council and 
assembly, tried civil disobedience, and finally turned to 
violence. On May 16, 17 71, the two-hour Battle of Alamance 
was a decisive military defeat for the Regulators at the 
hands of Governor Tryon's militia forces. The Regulators
were not a mob; out of a taxable population of 8,000 men 
from the three counties, between 6,000 and 7,000 joined the 
rebels. Although the revolutionary allegiances of these 
citizens may never be known with certainty, many Regulators 
were hostile or indifferent to the Whigs in the early years 
of the Revolution. For example, over five hundred 
backcountry citizens in early 1775 signed addresses of 
loyalty to the crown.17
Whig and Tory leaders recognized the potential power 
of the ex-Regulators. Governor Martin found the "peoples 
in the western parts of this Province withstanding . 
steadily all the efforts of the factions to seduce them 
from their duty". They breathed a "good spirit" into the 
western counties, the most "populous part of the 
province". Patriot leader Samuel Johnston was warned that 
" [James] Hunter, the Regulator," threatened to bring one 
thousand men from Guilford to interrupt the Third 
Provincial Congress meeting in Hillsborough in August 
1775. In May 1775, Lord Dartmouth wrote that the "Spirit
9in support of Government has shown itself in the back 
Settlements of North Carolina, and is considered by the 
King as a Circumstance that we ought in the present moment 
to improve to every possible a d v a n t a g e " . ^  John Adams 
recognized that the restless North Carolina backcountry 
offered the most resistance to Whig authority, which he 
attributed to the "hatred11 the ex-Regulators felt "towards 
their fellow citizens". Both revolutionaries and British 
strategists realized that fifty percent of the colony's 
total population lived in the backcountry.19 Pockets of 
loyalism could even be found in the valleys of the Blue 
Ridge Mountains, where small farmers were alarmed by the 
economic boycotts and embargoes of the Whigs. 20 yet why 
would only one hundred ex-Regulators fight at the Battle of 
Moore's Creek Bridge?
Governor Martin believed that because the men of the 
backcountry took the oath of allegiance after Alamance, 
they would support the crown, not embrace their former 
enemies the Whigs and would never again contest British 
authority. However, it is likely that the majority of them 
decided to remain neutral and sit out the war. Perhaps the 
renewed conflict with Britain seemed anti climactic to 
their earlier struggle for greater democracy.21 So who did 
take up arms for King George III?
The Highlanders of Cumberland County were the key to 
Martin's mobilization. There were nearly fifteen thousand
10
Highland settlers in North Carolina, and Martin estimated 
that three thousand would join h i m . 22 One-fourth the total 
migration from Scotland during the years 1768 and 1775 
arrived in North Carolina, with the colony gaining about 
five thousand Scots. Despite the rumors of war, 172 new 
Highland emigrants arrived off Cape Fear as late as October 
21, 1775. Why was the largest, earliest and most vigorous
settlement of Highlanders in America prior to 1783 along 
the Cape Fear River in North C a r o l i n a ? 23
There was in Scotland a Carolina "mania" that did not 
end until the outbreak of the Revolution. One wave of 
immigration arrived immediately after the Battle of 
Culloden in 1745. All North Carolina taxes were remitted 
for ten years for any Scottish immigrant. This tax 
incentive was offered by Governor Johnston, himself a 
Scot. Economic and social upheaval caused a second wave of 
migration from 1760 to 1775, and the decline of the clan 
was a key f a c t o r . 24
Many colonists feared that the radical element in 
America would be strengthened by the tide of unhappy 
Highlanders. The region received shiploads of "harassed, 
down-trodden and maligned people".23 The mainland and 
island areas north and west of the Grampian Mountains were 
the Highlands, a mysterious area to any Englishman in the 
1700s. It was full of people sharing in bizarre 
traditions, speaking in a peculiar language, and paying
11
little attention to the pronouncements of Parliament. 
Subsequently, British commissioners were instructed in 
September 1775 not to give clearance papers to those 
vessels carrying Highlanders bound for America.26
In 17 73, an unknown author under the pseudonym "Scotus 
Americanus" published a pamphlet praising North Carolina as 
the colony "most proper for Highlanders of any degree to 
remove to, if they want to live in a state of health, ease 
and independence". Perhaps unknown to most of the 
Highlanders were the requirements issued by Governor 
Martin. All settlers had to declare their loyalty to the 
King and promise "to lay down their lives in defense of His 
Majesty’s Government".27 The Scottish also faced abuse and 
intimidation throughout the thirteen colonies. Even in the 
original draft of the Declaration of Independence, 
Jefferson accused the British of sending to the colonies 
not only "soldiers of our common blood, but Scotch and 
foreign merceneries to invade and destroy u s " . 28 The words 
"Tory" and "Scot" were synonyms. Scottish prisoners from 
Fraser’s Highlanders were called "rascally cut-throat dogs, 
murtherers, and blood hounds".29 Despite the derision and 
ridicule, four circumstances gave the Highlanders strong 
reason to persevere as staunch Loyalists.
First, even with the bitter memories of the Battle of 
Culloden, the British had succeeded in pacifying their 
former enemies. The Highlanders were transformed by
12
British policies after 1746: the banning of distinctive 
clan garb, confiscation of all weapons, forbidding military 
service for their chiefs, and restriction on the clergy. 
There was no longer danger of revolution. The Highlanders' 
military abilities were widely respected, though their 
tactics seemed primitive and reckless. Historian Duane 
Meyer noted that "the signal to attack was followed by a 
mad charge at the enemy as the clansmen shrieked, screamed, 
and brandished their claymores. The very sound and fury of 
the Highland army terrorized its opposition."30 With the 
coming of the American Revolution, London relied heavily on 
these Highland warriors.
A second motivating factor was fear of reprisal. More 
than any group in the empire, the Highlanders were 
acquainted with the painful aftermath of an unsuccessful 
revolution. Governor Martin and several other Tory leaders 
threatened the Highlanders with retaliation if they refused 
to fight for the King. Martin promised that properties and 
lives would be forfeited. Many Highlanders were convinced 
that the British army was invincible. A Highlander named 
William Bourk proclaimed in the winter of 17 76 that "we 
should all be subdued by the month of May, by the king’s 
troops".31
A third factor has already been discussed: the
generous land grants of Governor Martin and the solemn oath 
that went with them. Further, British policies such as the
13
Stamp Act rarely concerned the Highlanders, for they lived 
in an isolated community around Cross Creek. A final 
reason for the fidelity of the Scots can be found in the 
large numbers of retired officers on half pay living in 
North Carolina. Many of them quickly volunteered in 
Loyalist units, and they formed the nucleus of the
leadership c o r p s . 32
By no means was the Highlander response unanimous. 
They provided manpower to both Whig and Tory. In August 
1775 the Whig Provincial Congress sent an unsuccessful 
twelve-man delegation to recent Scottish settlers to gain 
their support. However, the Highlander’s unbending loyalty 
to his landlord, in this case Governor Martin, put Tory 
recruiters at a distinct advantage. As early as March 
1775, Governor Martin was confident in procuring "a 
considerable body of Highlanders in the Midland counties in 
whose Zeal and Steadfast loyalty I can safely c o n f i d e " . 3 3  
Historian Ian Graham claimed that the Highlanders provided 
so much of the Tory manpower that when nearly all of the 
officers of the Highlanders fell into Whig hands after the 
Battle of Moore's Creek Bridge, there was little danger of 
another "Highland uprising" in the near future. For years 
after the battle, the campaign was known as the 
"Insurrection of Clan MacDonald".34 Only thirty one years 
after the bitter defeat at Culloden, the Highlanders were 
the most loyal friends of the King in North C a r o l i n a . 3 3
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The settlement far to the north and west of the 
Highlanders failed to support the Crown. The Moravians 
were ardent pacifists who were more sympathetic with the 
Whigs. With the Loyalists gathering at Cross Creek, "three 
times the Brethren of Salem were asked for their 
assistance, especially for an advance of money". The 
Moravians refused, claiming they "could not meddle," and 
that "God so ordered that no one was drawn into the 
movement". A Moravian merchant with nine wagons of salt 
was detained by the Loyalists at Cross Creek, but was 
released after twenty four hours and an earful of threats.36 
In summary, Governor Martin's hopes for a powerful 
Tory army rested on the shoulders of the Highlanders and 
ex-Regulators. After the Cross Creek rendezvous, they were 
somehow to "smuggle themselves down to Wilmington, 
regardless of what forces they left in their rear, provided 
they met none in front to oppose their progress".37 
Martin's orders for raising the royal standard could not be 
changed, even though the news of the British delays reached 
him early. Lack of communication with the interior of the 
colony made it treacherous to cancel the rendezvous, and it 
was believed that the Whigs had acquired the names of the 
Tory leaders and might crush the movement before it began. 
Local leaders assured Martin that no less than three 
thousand would be mustered, even though no more than one 
thousand arms were available.38
15
Loyalist hopes brightened with the arrival of two 
Scottish-born officers sent by General Gage to enlist 
recruits for the Royal Highland Emigrant Regiment. Lt.
Col. Donald MacDonald was a veteran of Culloden, and
Captain Donald McLeod had fought beside him at Bunker 
Hill. In the meantime, local chieftains Allan McDonald and 
his son-in-law Alexander McLeod raised two companies of 
Loyalists. In general, the recruits were poor and recent 
immigrants. Highlanders of long residence in North
Carolina generally refused to commit themselves, although 
three of the five Scotch delegates to the Whig Provincial 
Congress at Hillsborough now joined the Loyalist cause.39
Donald MacDonald was commissioned Brigadier General, 
and on February 1, 1776, he raised the royal standard at 
Cross Creek. Hundreds of Highlanders responded with 
alacrity, many attending the spirited nightly balls given 
to bolster morale. The governor believed that seven 
thousand men had joined him, but actually only 1,500 were
in the field. On the day of the battle, Martin still
believed that 3,500 Tories took part.^0 Only one week 
behind schedule, the Tories marched from Cross Creek with 
1,400 Highlanders and 130 backcountry Loyalists on February 
18. They carried 650 guns.^l
Where were the ex-Regulators? Leaders of several 
backcountry units on their way to Cross Creek were arrested 
and thrown into jail at Halifax, the recruits returning
16
home. Smaller groups were dispersed by patriot militia. 
When Donald McLeod took command of five hundred backcountry 
Tories, he rewarded them with a hogshead of rum, which they 
promptly consumed. When a rumor started that the Whigs 
were fast approaching, the five hundred disappeared and 
left McLeod to fend for himself. Other groups arrived at 
Cross Creek only to depart when two promises were broken: 
Governor Martin was not present, nor were the expected one 
thousand British regulars.^ Charles Stedman later 
reminded British officials that "if the mother-country 
would provide a respectable force to countenance and 
cooperate with them, they would immediately attach 
themselves to her cause"
Col. James Moore was nearby with two thousand patriot 
militia. On the night of February 18 the armies encamped 
four miles apart at Rockfish Creek. Under flags of truce, 
MacDonald sent Moore a copy of the January 10th 
Proclamation, and Moore delivered the test oath of the 
Continental Congress. After two days of verbal sparring, 
MacDonald suddenly withdrew his forces back to Cross 
Creek. As a British officer, his main objective was to 
reach Wilmington to deliver recruits for the Royal Highland 
Emigrant Regiment. Reports that six hundred reinforcements 
under Richard Caswell were on their way to join Moore also 
discouraged a Tory assualt.^
Time was against MacDonald and the Tories. Two
17
companies returned homo and Moore had finally slammed shut 
all the roads to the sea. MacDonald again set out from 
Cross Creek and headed down the east side of the Cape 
Fear. Patriot forces again blocked them, this time at 
Corbett's Ferry on the Black River. According to Stedman, 
Caswell was "a sensible, discerning man," who "readily 
foresaw their route would be by the Black River Road". 
Sensing battle, MacDonald issued his company of shock 
troops broadswords and claymores, the traditional hand 
weapons of the Scots. Again, the Tory attack was cancelled 
when a captured enemy scouting party revealed that Caswell 
had entrenched himself on the far side of the river.45
MacDonald's troops crossed the Black River four miles 
upstream of the enemy by February 26. The Tories escaped 
the trap by detaching a decoy unit that beat drums, 
squealed bagpipes, and popped rifles near the Whig camp 
while the main body of Highlanders marched up the river. A 
surprised Caswell hurried his troops downriver towards 
Moore's Creek and won the race against the Loyalists, who 
lagged six miles to the west. The Whigs dug themselves 
into an impregnable defensive position near the lazy tidal 
creek, and were reinforced by a battalion of Wilmington 
minutemen under the command of Col. Alexander Lillington. 
Even more troops were speeding overland from Dollison's 
Ferry under Colonel Moore in an attempt to assist Caswell. 
Eighteen miles and one thousand patriot militia now
18
separated the Loyalists from Wilmington.4-6
As the Loyalists launched their final drive for the 
coast, Brig. Gen. MacDonald fell ill. His secretary, James 
Hepburn, was sent under a flag of truce to the enemy camp 
to deliver the usual demands for the oath of allegiance and 
surrender, and secretly to gather information on the
enemy's defenses. Hepburn's glowing reports of Caswell's 
vulnerable position on the near side of Moore's Creek
proved fatal. That night, the diligent Caswell removed his 
men fifty yards beyond the far side of the creek and threw 
up entrenchments within this muck-ridden trap.4-7
MacDonald hastily called a council of officers. 
Although half of his men were without firearms and the 
older officers strongly opposed an attack, the younger and 
more aggressive faction prevailed. Donald McLeod was to 
lead the dawn assault. Only five hundred of 1,600 men had 
firearms as they marched out of camp at one o'clock on the 
morning of February 27. After floundering through six 
miles of swamps, they reached Caswell's abandoned campsites 
by dawn. McLeod then ordered three columns to advance
across the bridge, with James Campbell's broadswordsmen 
leading the way. The Highlanders' rallying cry, "King
George and Broad Swords," was passed along the line. As 
historian Hugh Rankin described it, "Three cheers rang out, 
the drums began to roll and the shrill squeal of bagpipes 
bit through the cool morning air". Only nine men would
19
make it across the bridge.^
There was not much left of the bridge at this point. 
Half the planking had been removed, and Caswell had greased 
the two bare log stringers with soft soap and tallow. 
McLeod and Campbell led a furious charge on the patriot 
works. They were met by "Old Mother Covington and her 
daughter,11 two cannon that combined with musket fire to 
sweep the bridge clean, wiping out the leaders and toppling 
others into the creek. McLeod was mortally wounded, with 
nine musket balls and twenty-four swan shot raking his 
body. As Lillington's patriot militia encircled the 
confusion and broke through the Loyalists' rear, the rout 
became complete. Loyalists who managed to cross the bridge 
were all shot down, with McLeod's body just a few paces 
from Caswell's earthworks.4-9
There were feeble efforts to rally the shattered 
Tories. According to Stedman, the Highlanders' fire was 
"hasty and wild". "Those from the backcountry were more 
successful in their retreat, as being better woodsmen than 
the Highlanders."50 Colonel Cotton fled at the initial 
roar of the cannon, and Thomas Rutherford, former member of 
the Provincial Congress, "ran like a lusty fellow." 
MacDonald had remained in the Loyalist camp and was soon 
captured. The bewildered Loyalists crashed through the 
marshes, while a few lucky ones escaped on horses cut from 
supply wagons. As many as three men on a single horse
20
joined the headlong flight.51
Several hours after the battle, Colonel Moore arrived 
at the scene and organized a pursuit. Over 850 Loyalists 
and more than thirty officers were captured. Most of the 
rank and file were paroled, while the officers were tried 
in Halifax and then sent to Philadelphia prisons. The 
spoils of war included 150 dirks and swords, 1,500 stand of 
firearms, two medicine chests, thirteen wagons with teams, 
and a chest holding Jpl5,000 in gold coins. General 
MacDonald's muster lists were also found, discouraging 
those who escaped from returning to their homes.52 Josiah 
Martin fled the colony altogether, departing with the 
British squadron bound for Charleston, South Carolina. He 
described the battle as a "little check the loyalists here 
have received". British officials casually placed the 
blame on "accidental delays" and "unfavorable c o n d i t i o n s " .53 
Perhaps the most immediate cause for the defeat was 
the divided leadership of the Loyalists. They failed to 
anticipate the vigorous opposition to their march, and many 
Loyalists saw the campaign only as an opportunity to 
restore the exiled Governor Martin to his mansion at New 
B e r n .5^ The failure of British troops to arrive in time to 
assemble and arm Tories was another reason for the Moore's 
Creek debacle. In fact, the problem of integrating 
Loyalists into the regular army would never be resolved. 
Historian Paul Smith remarked that "Loyalists never
21
occupied a fixed, well-understood place in British 
strategy’1.55 They would become dispirited and 
disillusioned by the continual failure of the world's most 
powerful nation in fighting a limited wilderness war across 
an ocean, where her manpower and logistics were stretched 
beyond their limits.56 Moore's Creek Bridge was only the 
first of several disappointments for the King's friends.
Was a Loyalist victory possible at Moore's Creek 
Bridge? If a healthy General MacDonald had led a veteran 
army into hand-to-hand fighting, the Loyalists might have 
been able to reach Wilmington. There Tory numbers might 
have swelled to ten thousand by the time deserters and 
ex-Regulators, emboldened by victory, poured in from the 
backcountry. A junction with Governor Martin would have 
made the army a formidable element in future British 
strategy. Historian Robert DeMond believed that victory 
might have enabled the British to conquer North Carolina in 
1776.57 Instead, after the Britsh expedition bungled their 
attack on Charleston, they abandoned the southern campaign 
altogether. Initial Loyalist enthusiasm faded.
A grim test now awaited the infant Whig government in 
North Carolina. In the coming years, with no end to the 
Revolution in sight, could patriot leaders extinguish the 
glowing embers of loyalism without igniting a new 
conflagration? Would they establish legitimate law and 
order without alienating the King's friends? An uneasy
22
four years would pass before the redcoats returned to rally 
the Tar Heel Loyalists. Echoes of the Highlanders' valiant 
struggle in the swamps of Moore's Creek would haunt the 
countryside for the remainder of the American Revolution.
Tis the summons of heroes for conquest or death,
When the banners are blazing on mountain and heath,
They call to the dirk, the claymore, and the targe,
To the march and the muster, the line and the charge.5°
23
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CHAPTER II 
TORIES ON THE RUN: 1775-1780
The four years following the Battle of Moore's Creek 
Bridge were the most crucial for North Carolina during the 
American Revolution.1 With the British Army abandoning 
them, many North Carolina Tories agreed with Sir Henry 
Clinton's prediction that they would have to face the "rage 
and fury of an incensed multitude".2 Both contemporaries 
and historians have debated the effectiveness of North 
Carolina's Whig government of 1775-1780. Some, like 
historian Jeffrey Crow, accused the Whigs of conducting a 
brutal campaign of terror that created Loyalists out of 
neutrals. Crow claimed that by 1780, a significant group 
of angry and revengeful Tories overran the state, and that 
Whig policy failed to extinguish "lower class resistance" 
to the revolution.3 Historian A. Roger Ekirch interpreted 
these events very differently. He found the Whig oligarchy 
to be decisive in severely punishing overt loyalism and in 
maintaining regular court sessions. Although they 
recognized their lack of backcountry support, the Whigs 
established a much needed degree of public order and 
confidence in government. By the early 1780s Ekirch 
claimed, the majority of the state sided with the Whig
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government because it promised peace and stability.^
Those who lived through these troubled years recorded 
mixed reviews of Whig effectiveness. James Iredell, state 
Attorney General from 1779-1781, lamented that many 
citizens adhered to the "reign of the Tories” out of "fear 
and in consequence of the distractions of the times,” and 
in "terror for their Persons and Property” .5 Archibald 
Maclaine, Whig representative in the provincial congresses, 
wrote bitterly in 1781 of the "tyranny under which this 
part of the country groans,” attributing much of it to the 
"malice, and self-interested views” of the "newly converted 
loyalists” . Years earlier he had warned that if the 
anti-loyalist statutes were not softened, especially the 
excesses of the Confiscation Act that violated the canons 
of "civilized nations,” they would trigger reprisals 
against American merchants.6 Exiled Royal Governor Josiah 
Martin complained in 1780 that the North Carolina Loyalists 
"had been intimidated beyond belief by the cruel 
apprehensions of their persecutors” .7 The Moravians noted 
in 1776 that the harsh treatment they received from the 
Whigs almost forced them to side with the crown. Four 
years later they reported that "barbarous and unjust 
treatment” drove many "who would gladly have remained 
peaceful” to the Tories, and that "all circumstances
11 ftindicate that people everywhere would like to have peace .° 
That both Tory and Whig factions wanted peace is
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significant. In fact, historian Carole Troxler concluded 
that the cultural, economic, occupational, racial, ethnic, 
class, religious, and age backgrounds of the Loyalists were 
"virtually indistinguishable" from those of the
revolutionary camp. According to Troxler, the hated Tories 
were a representative cross section of the state's 
population, including farmers (forty-seven percent), 
shopkeepers and merchants (thirty percent), officeholders 
(eleven percent) and professional people (four percent). 
The key to understanding the fears, motives and responses 
of this group lies with the local issues which affected 
their daily lives, property, money, and r e l i g i o n . 9 There 
was indeed a fine line between Loyalist and Whig, and the 
burden of preventing the "distractions of the times" from 
motivating those with loyalist tendencies rested on the 
shoulders of the Whig statesmen.
Emerging first in 1774 and continuing until the 
ratification of the Federal Constitution in 1787, 
anti-loyalist legislation flourished in North Carolina. 
Until 1777, the safety committees in North Carolina were 
harsh but fair. Weapons in the Whig arsenal included 
publishing names, social isolation, and even confinement, 
with the aim of intimidating the Loyalists. County 
committees of safety were elected in late 1774 and 1775. 
The Wilmington committee was chosen in November 1774 to 
maintain peace, to execute the resolves of the First
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Continental Congress, and to "inspect the conduct of the 
Inhabitants" of the town in regards to those resolves.10 
The Association which the Congress drafted defined the term 
Loyalist: "foes to the right of British-America". A common 
punishment was publishing names of suspected Loyalists in 
local newspapers. Citizens were to "break off all dealings 
with him or her ".11-
In October 1775, the Second Continental Congress 
recommended the numerous assemblies and committees "to 
arrest and secure every person" who endangered the safety 
of the colony or American liberties.12 Likewise, the Third 
Provincial Congress appointed committees of "Secrecy, 
Intelligence and observation," giving them the power to 
arrest and examine all suspected Loyalists and to refer 
them to a higher authority if necessary.13 This was not 
just political rhetoric. In Bute County, William Duncan 
appeared before the committee after refusing to subscribe 
to the Association. He insisted on waiting until he 
received "Advice from his Owners". He was given one week 
to sign, and in the meantime there would be no dealings 
with him, and his name was advertised.!^ In June 1776, the 
Tryon Committee of Safety sent under guard to Rowan county 
the "netorious" Ambrose Mills, being one of the "greatest 
enemys of our pese". Mills had enough influence to 
"pradgudise not only his neighbors" but those "at a great 
distance" against the American cause. He was confined
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until a "fare Tryal" could prove "a great deal more . 
against him". Three months later, he was discharged after 
taking the o a t h . 15
Loyalist motives ran from medical to mystical. In 
October 1776, Temperance Snead petitioned the Provincial 
Congress for the release of her husband from a long 
confinement. His treasonous actions were brought on, in 
Temperance's words, from "unhappy instructions, ill advice, 
and wicked insinuations given by a certain James Cotton". 
Combined with his feeble mind and the "many disorders" that 
afflicted his body, Samuel Snead was driven to the Tory 
c a m p . 16 xhe examination of Henry Daniel in August 17 78 
revealed his reason for not taking the oath of allegiance: 
"he hoped god would keep him from the marke of the Beast," 
adding that "the Devil might join them Before he would".
If he was put into the Continental Army, Daniel promised to 
"shoot the first officer that would offer to Command him". 
The laws of the United States did not have "any Concern 
with him".I?
With how much emotion William Collson's petition was 
read in the General Assembly will never be known. He had 
gone "within the Enemys lines". He blamed "Mistaken 
Notions of Honour and Attachment" to the government under 
which he was born, and the influence of those "whom I 
thought much Wiser than my Self". "Sincerely Sorry" for 
what he had done, he claimed that he had never taken up
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arms aginst his country, and had now joined the patriot 
army "to Serve honestly and faithfully for the Space of 
Twelve months". He hoped to be restored to his estate the 
"priviledges of a Citizen". His petition was rejected.
Eleven citizens "Inimical to the Liberties of their 
country" in Wilmington came from all walks of life. Seven 
merchants, one doctor, two tailors, and a planter were 
publicly condemned in March 1775 for refusing to sign the 
association. There was to be "no trade, commerce, dealings 
or Intercourse" with t h e m . 19 Similarly, Doctor Piles' name 
was published in the Cape Fear Mercury because he refused 
to take the o a t h . 20 phe "wicked and detestable" James 
Hepburn, attorney at law in Cumberland county, attempted to 
raise a company to "Act against the American cause". He 
maliciously asserted that "50,000 Russians" were in his 
Majesty's service, already embarked to "subdue the 
A m e r i c a n s " .21 One month after his name was advertised, he 
signed the A s s o c i a t i o n .22 ^ "Vague complaint" was made in
December 1775 that the Reverend Cupples made an 
"unwarrantable or dangerous" statement regarding "Lord 
Dunmore's late Proclamation". The Bute committee acquited 
him, finding his intentions "friendly to this c o u n t r y " . 23 
In short, no profession offered a haven.
Beyond the committees, however, lay a vicious arena 
for extralegal justice. After the news of Lexington and 
Concord reached the colony in May 1775, many citizens took
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the law into their own hands. Violent measures were taken 
despite the protests of the moderate Whigs. These 
moderates realized that tar and feathers were not the most 
effective way of converting recalcitrant Tories.24
The experiences of Janet Schaw, a Scotch woman 
traveling through the Cape Fear region from March to 
September 1775, accurately reflected the grim realities 
that awaited many Loyalists. She reported a state of 
martial law in North Carolina. Those who refused to drill 
with the militia "must fly out of the country," leaving 
their effects to the mercy of the people "whose kindness is 
little to be t r u s t e d " . 25 During a military parade, Schaw 
heard the "cry of tar and feather". It was a "poor English 
groom," who was "dragged forward, poor devil, frighted out 
of his wits". He was spared the tar bucket, but was 
mounted on a table and forced to beg "pardon for having
smiled at the regt," and was drummed and fiddled out of 
town, with "strict prohibition of ever being seen in it
again". When Schaw contested the authority of an officer 
in forcing the oath, the officer pointed to his soldiers, 
and with the "most insolent air," replied, "dispute it, if
you c a n " . 26
Schaw was shocked when she learned that if a man
refused militia duty in Wilmington, an officer with his 
"posse" might "cut up your corn, shoot your pigs, burn your 
houses, seize your Negroes and perhaps tar and feather
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y o u r s e l f " . 27 These were not idle threats. After burning 
Fort Johnston in July 1775, Whig troops "wantonly destroyed 
the corn and burnt the houses of several planters". These 
planters had aided Governor Martin, who at the time was 
exiled aboard the frigate Cruizer.28 Schaw also reported 
that one of the last members of the assembly loyal to 
Governor Martin, John Rutherford, was forced to give up his 
seat, and to resign his commission as "Receiver General of 
the quit-rents". Rutherford was "anxious in regards to his 
children," for the "ill humour" had reached a "very great 
height".29
The Moravians found that conditions in the backcountry 
had become "more and more debased" by 1777. Militia 
service could, in just a few months, turn "many a lad" into 
a "thorough scamp," for in a military setting, "Men became 
more and more brutal."20 Those who sided with the King 
were driven from their homes by persecution and many could 
be found hiding in the woods. Immediately after Moore’s 
Creek Bridge, Loyalists were "more sharply treated by their 
opponents," forcibly disarmed, and required to take an oath 
to remain neutral or to fight against Britain.31 One 
Moravian observed triumphant militia returning from a 
plundering escapade, many wearing "Scottish clothes".32
By December 1776, the state had adopted a 
constitution, and the first general assembly elected under 
its provisions met in April 1777. To that point, the state
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government had been a patchwork of conventions and councils 
that grappled with maintaining authority. By the close of 
1776, new laws against loyalist activities had spread over 
the land like a cancer. Jonathan Dix and David Thompson 
were put under guard after they applied for passes to 
travel to see their "Respective Families" in New England. 
They appeared "inimical to the American cause," but were 
later released.33 a Doctor Fallon was kept in close 
custody and later in near solitary confinement for a month 
for publishing "scandalous reflections," until he finally 
agreed to sign a recognizance for his good behavior.34 in 
fear of a Loyalist conspiracy in January 1776, all pilots 
on the Cape Fear were "immediately secured".35 in November 
17 75, the Wilmington committee ordered an examination of 
every family's weapons, allotting only one gun for each 
white man and giving a receipt for the value of those 
confiscated.36 Bute county formed a similar association 
for "patroling and Searcing Negro Houses, for Arms," and to 
apprehend murderers, horse stealers, and L o y a l i s t s . 3 7  a 
petition from thirteen prisoners from the New Bern jail in 
1776 asked "not anything Else But a fair and just trial". 
Confined for seventy days, they concluded with the hope 
that "sum of you knows sum of u s " . 3 8
Examples of mercy were rare. Pleading poor health and 
"Destitute of any means of Procuring a Livelyhood," the 
Reverend George Micklejohn petitioned the Provincial
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Congress in November 177 6 for permission to return to his 
family. Six months had passed since the congress removed 
him from the county because of an "inimical charge". His 
petition was granted.39 in October 1775, the Tryon County 
committee resolved to avoid "acts of inhumanity " against 
Loyalists. When Loyalist names were advertised, citizens 
were asked not to "coerce them by famine," or refuse them 
the "necessaries of life," especially by refusing to "grind 
at the mills".^ The congress, meeting in April 1776 at 
Halifax, expressed its "compassion" for the unhappy 
families of the Moore's Creek Bridge prisoners, who had 
been removed to other provinces. Claiming "We war not with 
the helpless females which they left behind," the congress 
considered the prisoners "hostages" for their families' 
good behavior.41
The year 1777 marked new beginnings for the state of 
North Carolina. The state constitution established a new 
government "in order to prevent Anarchy and Confusion".42 
An earlier congress had admitted "exercising a severity," 
prompted by a concern for the common safety and 
self-preservation. The Whigs continually fought a deep 
fear: that the Loyalists would rise again, either on their 
own or with the assistance of troops. The provincial 
congress at Halifax shuddered at the thought of Tories who 
might "drench this Province in blood and slaughter".43 
Laws punishing Loyalists after 1776 were
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straightforward and harsh. Their intent was to drive 
Loyalists from the state, not simply to put social pressure 
on them. Those refusing the oath in 1777 but allowed to 
remain in the state were barred from occupying any "Office, 
Appointment, License, or Election of Trust or Profit," and 
prohibited from voting. They could not prosecute any "Suit 
of Law," inherit land, keep "Guns or other Arms," convey 
land to others for longer than one year, or leave the state 
without permission from the governor and council.^ Those 
found guilty of Treason, usually as a result of actively 
opposing the state by enlisting with or provisioning the 
enemy, "shall suffer death without the Benefit of Clergy," 
and would have his or her estate forfeited. Misprision of 
Treason covered a broader range of activities, including 
conveying intelligence to the enemy, speaking or writing 
against the public defense, exciting people to "resistance 
and insurrection," spreading "false and dispiriting news," 
and discouraging "inlisting into the Service of this 
State". Punishment was "Imprisonment during the War," and 
forfeiture of one half of his or her "Lands, Goods, 
Tenements and Chattels".^5
"All free Male Persons" above the age of sixteen were 
required to take the state oath. Two special categories 
were noted. "All the late Officers of the King," and all 
who traded immediately to England or Ireland within the 
last ten years (storekeepers, agents, factors) were
39
required to take the oath or depart. Merchants could sell 
their real estate and property before they left. "Quakers, 
Moravians, Menonists and Dunkards" were required to take a 
similar oath, not requiring military service, or depart the 
state as well. A sixty day grace period was given before 
departure to "Europe or the West Indies". The county
courts, at their discretion, could compel a swift departure 
or grant permission to extend residency.^
The key to the evaluation of any law is its
interpretation (broad or narrow) and enforcement (lax, just 
or brutal). Whig officials hoped to prevent "Dangers which 
may arise from Persons disaffected to the State".^ Until 
Cornwallis' invasion of North Carolina in 1780, the Whigs 
were amazingly successful at averting these "Dangers". A 
case in point is the struggle surrounding the Confiscation 
Act of 1777.
Don Higginbotham has claimed that the most divisive 
issue to arise in state-level politics was the confiscation 
of Loyalist estates. He believed that many Whigs opposed 
the indiscriminate seizures of Tory property.^ The act 
called for all "Lands, Tenements, Hereditaments, and 
moveable Property" of persons "inimical" to the United
States confiscated by the state for its own use.
"Inimical" had many meanings: those presently absent from 
the country and having title to property on July 4, 1776, 
and those who had "aided or abetted the enemy". An open
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invitation was given for those "inimical11 to appear at the 
next general assembly held in October 1778 to be "admitted 
to the Priviledge of a Citizen," in which case his property 
would be restored to him.^9 However, with the crimes of 
Treason and Misprision of Treason well defined, few 
probably dared reentering the state.
Carrying the act into effect took additional pieces of 
legislation. In 1778, each county court was to appoint 
three commissioners to discover, take possession, and 
render accounts of the forfeited lands.50 it was not until 
1779 that sixty eight estates were declared confiscated,51 
and in 1780 the act was suspended. Reasons for its 
suspension ranged from the "unsettled state of public 
affairs" caused by the fall of Charleston, fluctuations of 
the economy, and the failure of the act to answer "the 
purposes intended".52 The suspension came in the nick of 
time for Robert Fields, who in September 1780 took the oath 
and had his property "Unconditionally Restored to h i m " . 53
Commencing with a call for a simple inventory of 
estates belonging to Moore!s Creek Bridge prisoners in May 
1776, the demand for confiscation spread throughout a broad 
segment of the population. Even for the Moravians, the 
land office had become a "veritable Inquisition". Portions 
of the confiscated estates were reserved for wives, 
families, and aged parents living on them, and in one case 
particular attention was paid to the wife and children on
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an inventoried estate to provide them with the "common 
necessaries of l i f e " . 54 By no means was the Confiscation 
Act an example of appalling brutality or the blind rage of 
Whig lawmakers.
James Iredell emerges as a champion of moderation. 
His cousin, Henry Eustace McCulloh, had more land at stake 
than anyone else: 49,150 acres.55 Leaving North Carolina 
in 1773 to act as an agent for his ailing father, he 
returned to the United States in 1778 to prevent disposal 
of his property and to claim "accidental and Unoffending 
Absence".56 in an emotional petition to the General 
Assembly in 1779, Iredell requested that his cousin be 
granted more time for "his personal appearance," and that 
no punishment should be inflicted where there has been "no 
crime".57 He urged McCulloh in the "strongest manner" to 
appear personally before the congress to "prevent a most 
dreadful I n j u r y " . 58 Iredell believed that McCulloh and 
others were real British subjects, many of whom were absent 
from the state because of circumstances out of their 
control, and therefore owed no allegiance to North 
C a r o l i n a . 59 por example, Thomas Bog's "busines of great 
Consequence" kept him out of the state, and he explained 
that he had earlier refused to take the oath because it 
would have prevented him from attending his business in 
England.60 Despite Iredell's position as the state's chief 
legal officer, his petitions to save McCulloh's estates
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were rejected.61
Iredell was not alone. In May 1780, the merchants of 
Cape Fear cited the Confiscation Act as endangering the 
"credit of the State," reminding the legislature that 
merchants carried on "extensive business without any Funds 
of Their own," but with credit from abroad. Confiscating 
the property of persons who "may be subject to the Enemy" 
was contrary to the custom of "civilised nations"; they 
noted losses to honest citizens while giving the dishonest 
man a chance to "defraud his creditor". Certainly there 
was more British property in America than American property 
in England.62
Radical Whigs clamored for more. "The Offender is 
very inadequately punished," cried petitioners from 
Mecklenburg County. That "Heirs claiming confiscated 
properties" were given an unlimited time to do so, and the 
lands could be rented for one year terms but not sold, made 
the act "repugnant" to its intentions.63 Thirty-four 
petitioners from Hanover county attempted to add a new 
twist to the law. Thomas Rogers, being a "Great Sufferer 
by the Tories," and lately having captured two horses and 
two wagons from them, hoped to sell the plunder "to make 
Good his now Damages".64 Charles McLean's "militia" failed 
in the pursuit of some Tories, but "Laide hold of several 
horses" belonging to the Tories and put them to sale as a 
"Reward Due them". In a petition, they "took Bond" to the
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governor in the "Name of the State".65 McLean and 
countless others sought to legalize their depredations.
Local vigilantes and impromptu militia units were out 
of the reach of law and order. Raw militia were sent out 
to harass and frighten suspected Tories. Companies of 
light horse were often hired out to bring "disorderly 
persons" to justice.66 The draft requiring miltia service 
inflamed Loyalist resistance. In December 1778, a Moravian 
was threatened with "ruin" if his son was not "delivered" 
to a militia captain. Besides paying a heavier tax, the 
Moravians paid a 5 fine for each draft refusal.67
Throughout the year 1780, the Moravians noted several 
Tory hunts conducted by out-of-state militia. A Colonel 
Armstrong warned the Salem congregation that a troop of 
light horse from Virginia known to "deal sharply" with 
Tories was a p p r o a c h i n g .68 a "wandering party" from South 
Carolina amused themselves by threatening to burn Salem, 
believing it to be the home of Tories. Twenty light horse 
threatened to make a brother "go with them," accusing him 
of lodging British officers; later it was discovered that 
the light horse "were really South C a r o l i n i a n s " .69 Their 
villages temporary Tory prisons, the Moravians witnessed 
whippings and beatings; one Tory received "more than a 
hundred lashes".70 When the Tories did escape capture, 
their livestock was often taken as compensation.
There were signs of occasional leniency. In 1780,
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Tories could surrender and receive pardon, usually under 
the condition that they would serve three months or longer 
in the manpower-starved American army. Some were even 
allowed "to go home and wash their clothes".7 2 American 
commander William Smallwood's proclamation of October 1780 
attempted to control plundering: any soldier engaging in 
that practice would be hanged.73
Considering the magnitude of the changes in the 
revolution and the incessant war that engulfed the 
colonies, the Whig transition to power was surprisingly 
smooth. North Carolina's definition of treason was similar 
to most of the states, and many Whig leaders, including 
James Iredell, fought to maintain procedural rights in 
legal matters and refused to jettison the rule of l a w . 7 4  
Since the Continental Congress in Philadelphia lacked the 
power to crush localized disaffection, the responsibility 
for this assault on the "internal enemy" lay with the 
states. North Carolina's legislators made few radical 
changes in law, and their fundamental judicial framework 
was virtually a copy of the pre-revolutionary court 
s y s t e m . 75 Just how much the hysteria of the times 
disrupted the actual operation of justice is open to debate.
Some judicial irregularities suggest that the court 
system did not operate without prejudice during the 
revolution in North Carolina. Iredell received a complaint 
from William Hooper in 1778 that a man "convicted of an
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atrocious murder, without a single circumstance to palliate 
his guilt," was given a reprieve by the governor. The 
following day the culprit escaped. Hooper noted the 
negative effect this and other injustices had on the 
Loyalists: "Our Laws they say are caput mortuum." Whig 
laws either "cannot be executed," or the Whigs are "afraid 
to execute them". Hooper believed that corrupt court 
practices would be an "encouragement to Secret 
assasination, when agression thus escape with impunity".
For example, resolves of the House and Senate in November 
1779 requested the governor to "grant a Pardon" to two 
officers for the killing of Lemuel Jones and William Coyle, 
"two known T r a i t o r s " . A c t i o n s  such as these only 
worsened the bitterness between the two factions.
The Whig government succeeded in preventing 
counterrevolution in North Carolina during the American 
Revolution. However, in the summer of 1777, a plot shook 
the uneasy government to its foundations. Historian 
Jeffrey Crow's study of the Llewelyn Conspiracy concluded 
that motives for it were a "curious blend of Anglican 
faith, personal malice, and loyalty to the Crown".78
In an effort to establish secret Tory societies in the 
South, wealthy planter John Llewelyn and at least ninety 
others organized themselves in late 1776. The movement had 
heavy religious connotations. Noting that the Anglican 
Church was disestablished in 17 76 and appealing to the
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simple Anglican farmers, Llewelyn planned to seize the 
magazine at Halifax with the hope of cooperating with 
Britsh commander William Howe. After this was aborted, 
Llewelyn engaged in later plots and called for killing "all 
the heads of the country," capturing the magazine and the 
governor during a planned slave rebellion, and assasinating 
several personal enemies of his own. These violent 
intrigues were discovered before they were implemented, yet 
none of the conspirators was executed.79 The following 
year a smaller plot was uncovered, the leaders hoping to 
"ride to Our horses knees in Liberty Mens Blood and Guts". 
Another conspirator later claimed that the "liberty party 
were all turning Romans".80
A large amount of the violence during the 1775-1780 
period lacked purpose. Outlaw gangs ran amuck, intent on 
plundering, beating and killing, but often in the name of 
no specific cause. The violence increased and Whig 
hegemony crumbled with the return of Britsh redcoats in 
1780 and the establishment of a British haven for Loyalists 
in Wilmington. The revengeful Loyalists under local 
chieftain David Fanning waged a brutal civil war with the 
bewildered Whig militia. Leaders from both sides accused 
one another of "barbarities that would disgrace the 
Savage," and "wanton exercises of cruelty". An American 
general remarked that "civil wars are always attended with 
something horrid," and the "bare Idea of Friend against
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Friend . . . shocks human nature".^ American Commander of 
the Southern Department, Nathanael Greene, believed that in 
1781 North Carolina was "in Danger of being laid waste by 
the Whigs and Tories who pursue each other with as much 
relentless Fury as Beasts of P r e y " . 8 2
In December 1781, at the height of this civil war, 
serious charges were levelled by several counties against 
the North Carolina Whig government. It was blamed for the 
violence that wracked the state. Mecklenburg county 
claimed that "there is Scarce a Shadow of civil government 
exercised in the State". Military power controlled many of 
the civil functions, the judicial department was "dormant," 
civil officers neglected their duties, militia officers 
manipulated others through "fraud, bribery and partiality," 
and the legislature failed to meet during "momentous 
affairs". Other petitions noted "the greatest robberies" 
and "acts of violence" committed upon Tory property and 
accused the department of war of being "deranged".$3
Despite these charges, the track record of the Whig 
government before the chaos of the final British invasion 
of 1781 is impressive. Few large scale acts of defiance 
emerged during these years. It is true that in 1778 a 
group behaved "in a riotous manner" at a militia muster and 
"Horawed for King George the T h i r d " . O t h e r  Loyalist 
utterances like "God damn the State" and "Huzza for King 
George" that were recorded during these years cannot
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overshadow the fact that by 1780, large numbers of hard 
core Loyalists had either left the state or had been 
killed.85 The Whigs had laid the foundation for peace and 
stability. Their harsh persecution of overt Loyalists 
dampened the spirits of fence-sitters and those casually 
committed to the crown. Many Loyalists who were able to 
endure the drafts, oaths, and confiscation probably simply 
wanted to be left alone by 1780.
The Whig regime forced hundreds of Tories to flee 
North Carolina. Josiah Martin reported in September 1777 
the arrival of two vessels in New York from the state, 
bringing "Twenty Two of His Majesty’s Refugee Subjects".^6 
Ten months earlier he reported from Long Island the arrival 
of "refugees who had taken sanctuary on board the ships in 
Cape Fear r i v e r " . &7 In July 1777, the North Carolina 
Gazette reported a vessel leaving the state, filled "with a 
great number of T o r i e s " . S o m e  groups begged the royal 
governor for the chance to leave, and to be granted the 
"prayer of our p e t i t i o n " . M a n y  were driven from their 
families and forced to hide out for years in the mountains.
Whig measures in the years 1775-1780 dismantled the 
strength of the King's friends in North Carolina by 
reducing their numbers and restoring civil government. The 
Whigs proved, even in the midst of war, their ability to 
establish legitimate authority.90 By the early 1780s, Whig 
strength would, however, be tested by a new British
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invasion under Lord Cornwallis. Whig resistance would 
frustrate Cornwallis' hopes and would cause Sir Henry 
Clinton to lament years later that Cornwallis' invasion was 
"so destructive a misapplication of his talents".91
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CHAPTER III 
SOUTHERN CAMPAIGN: 1778-1781
Over four and a half years after the Loyalist disaster 
at Moore's Creek Bridge, a British army under Lt. Gen. 
Charles Lord Cornwallis invaded North Carolina in late 1780 
with the hope of renewing Loyalists' still undoubted 
fidelity to the Crown. In the intervening period, the 
British war machine marched through the northern states, 
especially New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania. There 
were many British victories, but Washington's American army 
remained a viable force. After a resounding American 
victory at Saratoga, New York in late 1777, the rebellion 
acquired an international flavor. For England, the year 
1778 opened with impending threats from France and Spain, 
and the British command was compelled to split their 
forces. For the remainder of the Revolution, all major 
British offensives were confined to the southern states. 
Southern Loyalists loomed large in this new strategy.1
The growing burden of war debt and higher taxes, 
mounting criticism from the parliamentary opposition and 
the discouragement of top officials rocked the British war 
effort. Informed sources believed that even Lord North was 
for peace at any price, and naval commander Lord Howe
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asserted that England must abandon America altogether. The 
only way to win over a parliamentary majority to continue 
the war was to convince the opposition that a large, 
untapped reservoir of southern Loyalists would enable 
Britain to continue fighting both France and America.2 
Finally, the King's friends were in the spotlight.
Lord Germain put his hopes into "Americanization" of 
the war. The British could actually expand their 
operations with minimal expense once Loyalists were 
released from the Whig regime. As soon as redcoats 
liberated territory, loyal Americans would be responsible 
for defense and establishing law and order. The same 
redcoats could then move into other disaffected areas.3 
Much of the confidence in Loyalist strength had been 
generated earlier through glowing reports from several Tory 
leaders: Governors Lord William Campbell of South Carolina
and Sir James Wright of Georgia, and Lt. Col. Moses 
Kirkland, Deputy Superintendent of Indian Affairs in East 
Florida. Kirkland claimed that a "great Majority" of 
Carolinians were loyal subjects, "groaning under the 
usurped authority of Congress".^ To remove Whig tyranny 
from the South, General Henry Clinton, Commander in Chief 
of all British forces in America, embarked 3,500 men for 
Georgia in November 1778. In December 1779, a force of
8,500 troops departed for South Carolina.5
From 1779 to mid 1780, the war in the South proved to
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be a spectacular narrative of British victories, including 
the destruction of two Continental armies. Beginning in 
December 1778 and continuing through 1779, Georgia was the 
first to f a l l . 6 During this time, about seven hundred 
North Carolina Loyalists marched towards Savannah to join a 
new provincial corps, the North Carolina Volunteers. Their 
leader, John Hamilton, had left from New York with British 
forces, already accompanied by thirty exiled North Carolina 
Loyalists. As a result of numerous skirmishes, only half 
of the seven hundred Loyalists reached the British army in 
Georgia.^ North Carolina Whigs also marched to South 
Carolina and Georgia, prompting a Whig statesman to 
remark: nOur troops go to the Southward never to return, a
soldier made is a Farmer lost".^ Many North Carolinians 
never did return, a fact that would shape her response to 
the British invasion of 1780.
Clinton landed thirty miles below Charleston in 
February 1780. Backed by fourteen thousand British troops, 
sailors and marines, Clinton’s iron grip tightened around 
the beleaguered city until American Major General Benjamin 
Lincoln surrendered his 5,500 man army on May 12, 1780. 
Not only would this be the most severe reversal that an 
American army would suffer during the entire war, it 
eliminated the entire Continental establishment of North 
and South Carolina and Georgia.9
North Carolina Loyalists were jubilant. Over 1,200
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militia and 814 Continentals with sixty four officers, all 
from North Carolina, were marched off as prisoners of war. 
British regiments quickly overran South Carolina and 
established posts in the interior at Augusta, Ninety Six, 
Rocky Mount, Camden, Cheraw and Georgetown. Repentant 
Whigs and Carolina Loyalists were organized into militia 
units under Major Patrick Ferguson.10 British success in 
the South, the treason of Benedict Arnold, and the mutiny 
at Morristown, New Jersey made the coming months the 
darkest period of the revolution for the Whigs. Their 
enthusiasm hit its lowest point since December 1776.H  
Would North Carolina be the next domino to fall?
An immediate invasion of the state was not 
forthcoming. The British would avoid the summer heat and 
wait until early Fall when ripening crops would assure 
plenty of provisions. Clinton left Charleston on June 8 to 
return to New York, leaving Cornwallis in command of the 
South. Clinton would continue to underestimate the task of 
occupying North Carolina and saw it only as a minor 
operation leading up to a major one: an invasion of the 
Middle Colonies, beginning in the Chesapeake. British 
overconfidence in their strategy of "Americanization" would 
prove fatal in the months ahead. The overwhelming Loyalist 
response to British occupation never materialized, and that 
disappointment should have radically altered future plans 
for Cornwallis' new command. At a thousand miles distance,
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Clinton was unable to reassess British strategy.12 In the 
meantime, the mood in the Carolinas would shift 
dramatically.
Initial Loyalist efforts in western North Carolina 
were crushed. On June 20, despite warnings from Cornwallis 
to "remain quiet", 1,300 poorly armed North Carolina 
Loyalists under Colonel John Moore were annihilated by a 
detachment of Whig militia under Griffith Rutherford at 
Ramsour's Mill, North Carolina. After the battle, only 
three hundred Loyalists would continue on into South 
Carolina to join Cornwallis. Cornwallis blamed the 
disaster on the lack of "Order or Caution". The Loyalists 
would never again challenge the Whigs in that area of North 
Carolina.13
Shortly after this "unlucky business", four successive 
skirmishes in July all but destroyed British control of the 
Carolina backcountry. A panic stricken Loyalist force of 
eight hundred under a Colonel Bryan, aware of the disaster 
at Ramsour's Mill, fled to South Carolina when Whig militia 
approached. Sharp attacks were launched on British posts 
at Rocky Mount and Hanging Rock in early August. It is 
significant that in all of these encounters, the Whigs were 
the aggressors.1^ Viewing North Carolina as a haven for 
Whig partisans, Cornwallis boldly decided to invade the 
North State and chose Camden to be his base of operations.13
The Whigs hoped to organize a new Continental force to
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support growing partisan strength. Cornwallis' new 
opponent was Major General Horatio Gates, the grandfatherly 
hero of Saratoga. Arriving on Deep River in North Carolina 
in July 1780, he found himself commanding 1,400 Maryland 
and Delaware Continentals. Gathering militia as he marched 
into South Carolina, he unwisely took the direct but barren 
and Tory-infested route to Camden, instead of traveling 
through the friendly counties of Rowan and Mecklenburg. On 
August 16, his half-sick, half-starved and exhausted army 
met defeat at the hands of Cornwallis, who sent Gates'
2,500 militia reeling northwards while the Continentals 
temporarily held ground to prevent complete disaster. 
Barely seven hundred regulars regrouped at Hillsborough, 
North Carolina.16 Gates' three day, 130 mile flight from 
the field of battle ended his brief stint as commander of 
the Southern army.
Ironically, Camden did little to bolster declining 
Loyalist strength. Cornwallis still believed that if he 
did not attack North Carolina, the British would have to 
"give up both South Carolina and Georgia and retire within 
the walls of Charleston". He further reported that the 
attachment of "our poor distressed friends in North 
Carolina are as strong as ever," and he noted that the 
Highlanders had offered to form a regiment when the 
redcoats entered the state.17 Could Cornwallis invade 
North Carolina yet still follow Clinton's instructions of
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June 1, 1780: "to regard the safety of Charleston and the
tranquility of South Carolina as the principal and 
indispensable objects" of his attention? Clinton also 
recommended establishing a post on the Cape Fear River for 
"encouragement and succor" for Loyalists and to "strike 
terror into the lower counties, which were for the most 
h o s t i l e " . These intructions may have worked in June, but 
by September they demanded the impossible from Cornwallis.
Cornwallis reported the rise in partisan strength to 
Clinton. "The severity of the rebel government has so 
terrified and totally subdued the minds of the people," 
wrote Cornwallis, that the Loyalists were not "inclined to 
rise until they see our Army in motion".19 The country 
between the Santee and Pedee rivers was "in an absolute 
state of r e b e l l i o n " .20 Whig chieftains spearheaded a 
legendary opposition in the Carolinas. Many sought to 
revenge the "massacre" at the Waxhaws on May 29, 1780, a 
fierce encounter just inside the South Carolina border. 
Lt. Col. Banastre Tarleton and his Tory legion of 
Pennsylvania and New York Loyalists attacked retreating 
Virginia Continentals under Col. Abraham Buford shortly 
after the surrender of Charlestown. "Bloody Tarleton11 and 
his dragoons killed 113, wounded 150, and took fifty three 
prisoners. Buford's men reported continued slaughter after 
displaying white surrender f l a g s . 21 Tarleton's subsequent 
atrocities and ruthless raids fanned the flames of
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rebellion.
Brig. Gen. Thomas Sumter fought back. Nicknamed the 
"Gamecock," Sumter’s peaceful existence as an
ex-Continental officer was shattered when Tarleton*s 
dragoons burned his plantation. He quickly returned to the 
war as a Whig guerilla leader, disrupting communications 
and attacking British posts in upper South Carolina for the 
remainder of the British occupation. He paid off his 
fighters in goods, slaves and other Loyalist property, a 
practice that became known as "Sumter's L a w " . 22 Francis 
Marion’s partisan army in South Carolina similarly 
compelled the British to weaken their primary armies at the 
threat of Marion's approach. A natural leader, the "Swamp 
Fox" relied on the element of surprise to prevent Loyalists 
from organizing. In the same way, South Carolina militia 
Brigadier General Andrew Pickens successfully disrupted 
Loyalist recruiting activities. He destroyed mills used by 
the British for grinding grain, and coordinated his militia 
units effectively with Continentals, as witnessed in the 
North Carolina campaign of 1781. Pickens had taken a 
loyalty oath following the surrender of Charleston, but 
sought revenge after Tories plundered his p l a n t a t i o n . 2 3  
During this bitter civil war, the only Loyalist as 
effective as these Whig partisans was David Fanning of 
North Carolina.
Ironically, the British troops sent to aid the
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Loyalists quickly became hated overseers. On what 
historian Don Higginbotham terms the "Front behind the 
Front," life for the average backcountry civilian became 
harder under British occupation. Until 1780, the 
Revolution had left large areas of the Carolina backcountry 
untouched, and the inhabitants enjoyed a lack of 
governmental regulation. Now British forces, with hopes of 
a Loyalist majority, made their presence felt too 
strongly. On countless occasions, British officers ordered 
Whig plantations burned.24 Loyalists took advantage of 
British hegemony in South Carolina and settled old scores 
with rebel neighbors. Large numbers who had been 
indifferent or neutral now blamed the British for 
disrupting the peace. It often became impossible to
distinguish sincere Loyalists from lawless plunderers. 
Historian Carole Troxler claimed that formulating a British 
policy in the Carolinas that reconciled reluctant Americans 
and inspired pessimistic Loyalists "required wisdom beyond 
the command of the British in America".25
Perhaps the greatest British blunder came on June 3, 
1780, when Clinton suddenly took a hard line against the 
Whigs. In a controversial proclamation, Clinton forced all 
men paroled after Charleston to support the British 
actively and to take an oath of allegiance, or else be 
considered "enemies and rebels". This action drove many 
into the rebel camp and disheartened staunch Loyalists who
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now saw Whig firebrands retain all the privileges of 
British citizens by merely taking the oath of allegiance. 
The British command was relying on an alleged Loyalist 
majority and did not attempt to pacify the Whigs. As 
historians Franklin and Mary Wickwire pointed out, 
Clinton's proclamation laid the foundation for a "second 
rebellion" in South Carolina.26 American Lt. Col. Henry 
Lee referred to the proclamation as a "severe alternative, 
but justifiable in war".27
Even after Camden, the planned North Carolina invasion 
was postponed until supplies from Charleston arrived and 
the British recovered from epidemics of malaria and yellow 
fever. A frustrated Tarleton remarked that an immediate 
advance into North Carolina would have continued the 
"confusion and dispersion of the American army," but he 
admitted that "many material requisites" were lacking.28 
Cornwallis also continued to hope for a diversionary force 
in the Chesapeake, a move that he considered "of the 
greatest and most important advantage" to his strategy.29 
Cornwallis now watched as Loyalist forces evaporated. To 
the west, Loyalist leader Patrick Moore surrendered ninety 
three of his men and 250 stand of arms in an attack led by 
Col. Charles McDowell and Lieutenant Colonels Sevier and 
Clarke on the Pacolet River. After a skirmish with Major 
Ferguson, rebel forces struck the Tory camp at Musgrove's 
Mill on the Enoree River on August 19. The
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British-Loyalist force lost sixty three killed and 160 
wounded with American losses at four killed and nine 
wounded.30 Cornwallis' left wing was crumbling.
After a three week delay, Cornwallis moved north from 
Camden on September 8, only to be delayed two weeks by 
widespread illness. In the meantime, North Carolina's Whig 
governor Abner Nash called for a Board of War to preserve 
"liberty and order," assembled militia units to respond to 
the British threat, and recommended the "speedy trial of 
traitors".31 North Carolina's Whig partisans Col. William 
Davie and William Davidson prepared the defenses of 
Charlotte, North Carolina. Davie's horsemen dealt harshly 
with Tories and were nicknamed the "Bloody Corps". As
Cornwallis’ forces entered the state, the counties of
Mecklenburg and Rowan proved to be more "hostile to England 
than any others in America".32
Loyalists who did attempt to aid the British were 
"checked" by the "vigilance and animousity" of the Whigs. 
Intelligence concerning the Continental forces was totally 
unattainable, and all communication between Loyalist and 
redcoats was "totally destroyed". Even British foraging 
parties were "every day harassed".33 Colonel Davie 
launched surprise attacks on redcoats and Loyalists. He
referred to the latter as "lawless Marauders" who wreaked 
havoc and destruction. In one skirmish, Davie held off
Cornwallis' entire army for several minutes with a mounted
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force of no more than twenty. In another at Wahabs 
plantation, Davie attacked three hundred of the enemy and 
captured ninety-six horses and 120 stand a r m s . 34-
Cornwallis fought his way into Charlotte on September 
26 afer bitter street fighting with Davie's men. Josiah 
Martin, former royal governor of North Carolina, then 
returned to the state for the first time since 1776. 
Accompanying Cornwallis, he appealed to the Loyalists in a 
formal proclamation to "testify the reality of their 
loyalty and spirit," and to enlist in the provincial 
c o r p s . 35 This corps was under Martin's personal command, 
and he offered a bounty of three guineas, full pay, and 
free grants of land at the end of the war. Despite these 
efforts, North Carolina's Attorney General, James Iredell, 
wrote calmly to his wife that "Public affairs are not in so 
desperate a situation as perhaps at your distance may be 
conceived".36 Iredell sensed a turning point in the war in 
the South. In fact, a day before Iredell's letter was 
written, a smashing American triumph would put a sudden end 
to Cornwallis' first foray into North Carolina.
Cornwallis had dispatched Major Patrick Ferguson's 
Loyalist forces to the foot of the Blue Ridge Mountains to 
bolster the British left flank. Foolishly moving beyond 
the reach of Cornwallis, Ferguson's corps was attacked by 
the woodsmen of present day east Tennessee as well as some 
Carolina and Virginia frontiermen at King's Mountain, just
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inside the South Carolina border. Many were ex-Regulators 
who had left North Carolina in disgust between 1771 and 
1775. Ferguson had enraged his foes by a proclamation 
labelling then ''mongrels*' and the "dregs of mankind". In 
one of the fiercest battles of the Revolution, three 
hundred Loyalists were killed or wounded, and nearly seven 
hundred were captured. Included in the losses were 450 
North Carolina Loyalists under Col. Ambrose Mills. 
Ferguson was dead.37
In what Loyalist historian Robert DeMond called 
"unforgivable" action, the killing continued long after the 
Loyalists exhibited white flags. Later, a committee of 
colonels tried thirty-six of the captured Tories, charging 
them with murder, turning out women and children and 
destroying homes. Nine were executed.38 After the battle, 
Cornwallis complained to American General Smallwood that 
the Loyalists' treatment was "shocking to humanity".39 
Regardless of the morality of King's Mountain, North 
Carolina historian Samuel Ashe claimed the battle marked 
the "conquest " of the western Loyalists. DeMond called 
King's Mountain the "death blow" from which North Carolina 
Loyalists "never recovered".^
The first British invasion of North Carolina was 
over. One fourth of Cornwallis' army was destroyed. The 
"extent and poverty" of the state had worn it down. 
Loyalist support wilted once the true nature of the
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untenable British position at Charlotte was realized and 
the ruthless treatment of the Loyalists after King's 
Mountain was revealed. Even the British stronghold at 
Ninety Six seemed vulnerable to attack and its garrison 
doubtful. On October 12, 1780, Cornwallis' army began to 
withdraw to Winnsboro, South Carolina. During the retreat, 
Loyalist guides deserted the army, leaving it panic 
stricken. Thirty supply wagons were captured along the 
route. American confidence soared. Colonel Davie was sure 
that "the convention of Saratoga has flew through his 
lordship's head five hundred times" during the retreat.^ 
Wracked with fever, Cornwallis complained as he painfully 
jostled his way back to South Carolina that if there was a 
"powerful body of friends in North Carolina," they had not 
"given evidence of either their number or their 
activity".^ In other words, Cornwallis was now 
questioning the basic premise upon which the war in the 
South was based.
After the Revolution, Clinton wrote that the 
"precipitancy" of Cornwallis' abandonment of Charlotte 
"threw away forever" Loyalists' "confidence of support from 
the King's army," and that they were "exposed to 
persecution and ruin by his r e t r e a t " . P e r h a p s  Cornwallis 
should have marched to Cross Creek instead of Charlotte, 
where, as Tarleton argued, the inhabitants were "almost 
universally loyal".44 Would or could North Carolina
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Loyalists respond if a second invasion was made? If not, 
it would spell disaster for the next British army to try.
The year 1781 did in fact open with a renewed British 
invasion of North Carolina. For three months at Winnsboro, 
Cornwallis had pondered the future course of the southern 
campaign and decided that the only way of subduing the 
region was to carry the war to the Chesapeake. The 
alarming spread of disaffection and the constant incursions 
of the Whig partisans, not the Continental Army, kept the 
country in "continual alarm". Cornwallis declared that 
defensive measures would be "certain ruin to the affairs of 
Britain".^5 In addition, area Loyalists appeared outwardly 
disgusted with British performance and the conduct of 
British leaders.^ After receiving reinforcements from 
Maj. Gen. Alexander Leslie, Cornwallis marched northwards 
on January 7, 1781. His uncertainty was voiced in a letter 
to Clinton the day before his departure: "Events alone can
decide the future steps". Within four months, however, 
Cornwallis would be abandoning North Carolina altogether 
and would be marching towards a world turned upside down at 
Yorktown, Virginia.4-7
The new American Commander of the Southern Department, 
Nathanael Greene, arrived in 1780 and made the unorthodox 
decision to divide his outnumbered force. His decision 
would prove masterful. He placed the rugged Brig. Gen. 
Daniel Morgan 140 miles to the east with six hundred
71
regulars and North Carolina militia under General 
Davidson. Morgan destroyed Tarleton1s eight hundred light 
troops and all but a remnant of his feared cavalry at the 
Battle of Cowpens on January 17. The loss of these troops, 
used as scouts, guards and partisan fighters by the British 
was the equivalent of losing an entire army. Another 
quarter of his army destroyed, Cornwallis desperately 
pursued Morgan in hopes of regaining six hundred prisoners 
of war and saving dwindling British prestige. Morgan's 
army eluded Cornwallis and reunited with Greene, and the 
British commander made the fateful decision to destroy 
Greene's army at all cost. One British commander remarked 
that Cornwallis was determined to follow Greene's army to 
the "end of the world".^
The "Race to the Dan" was on. Greene was determined 
to avoid confronting Cornwallis until he could cross the 
Dan River and reach the safety of Virginia, where he could 
bolster his outnumbered forces. Reaching Ramsour's Mill in 
North Carolina and nipping at the heels of Greene's rear 
guard, Cornwallis destroyed all excess equipment and 
baggage to turn his army into a quick strike unit. The 
redcoats now only had the food they could carry and slept 
without tents. Upon reaching the Catawba River, Cornwallis 
overwhelmed the eight hundred militia contesting the fords 
and killed their commander, William Davidson. Heavy rains 
forced the British to turn northwards to cross the swollen
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Yadkin by the upper fords. In the meantime, Greene 
consolidated Morgan's forces and Brig. Gen. Huger's army of 
the Peedee River at Guilford Court House on February 9 and 
made his final drive towards the Dan. British soldiers 
faced an exhausted and hostile country and were still over 
twenty miles behind the Americans.^9
By February 14, Greene's army was safely across the 
Dan River. Mounted troops under Henry Lee hampered the 
British pursuit with constant harassment. As historian 
Hugh Rankin noted, Greene's strategic superiority over 
Cornwallis in the opening phase of the North Carolina 
campaign was demonstrated by the fact that Greene won the 
race. Greene's foresight in rounding up the boats and 
barges on the key rivers of the retreat route assured 
American escape. The populous state of Virginia now 
promised Continental and militia recruits, and provided a 
refuge to rest the American troops after a grueling march 
that left both armies ragged.50
Did this disastrous 180 mile chase across the breadth 
of North Carolina constitute the "Americanization" of the 
war that Parliament had hoped for? From the start of the 
campaign, Cornwallis consistently alienated the local 
population. At Winnsboro, his quartermaster corps' 
impressment of horses and wagons estranged neighboring 
Loyalists. As he drove into North Carolina, Cornwallis 
enraged slave owners by turning runaways into a black army
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of foragers who descended upon farms to carry off all 
livestock and foodstuffs.51 The Moravians "suffered much 
from the passing of the English".52 The "distressed and 
scanty" appearance of the redcoats themselves, who seemed 
incapable of offering assistance and rather in need of it, 
did little to inspire confidence.53 Perhaps Banastre 
Tarleton identified the gravest offense the British command 
had already committed even before this campaign: neglect.
He observed that until 1781, the British had never made any 
serious effort to "assist the well affected" in North 
Carolina. From the beginning of the Revolution until 
Cornwallis' invasion, the Loyalists had been reduced in 
number and spirit and that British neglect had "confirmed 
the power and superiority of the adverse party".54 Perhaps 
no military genius could have soothed the bitter memories 
at such a late date.
Cornwallis' army withdrew by easy marches to 
Hillsborough, North Carolina and raised the royal standard 
on February 20. He called for all faithful subjects to 
repair to the British army with their arms and ten days of 
provisions. Initial Loyalist response was promising. 
Henry Lee claimed that seven companies were raised in one 
day. Cornwallis met with Loyalist chieftain David Fanning 
to discuss additional recruiting.55 These hopes would fade 
as disaster struck one Loyalist unit after another.
A party of nearly four hundred Tories under Colonel
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John Pyle responded to the proclamation, but an American 
detachment under Lee and Pickens annihilated them. In an 
action known as "Pyle's Massacre," the Loyalists mistook 
the Whigs for Tarleton's men and allowed Lee's militia to 
parade through their ranks unchallenged. The Loyalists' 
salutation of "God Save the King" unleashed Whig wrath that 
left ninety Tories dead and the rest fleeing for their 
lives.56 A few days later, four Loyalists from the Deep 
River settlement were killed and scores wounded when 
Tarleton's jittery dragoons mistakenly fired on them. 
Shortly afterwards, a detachment of cavalry under American 
Col. William Washington killed twenty-three Loyalists 
herding cattle to the British army. These sharp encounters 
effectively dampened Tory recruiting.57
Only six days after raising the royal standard in 
Hillsborough, Cornwallis moved west to Alamance Creek 
between the Haw and Deep rivers, a reputed sanctuary for 
"numerous friends" of the King and site of the final battle 
of the Regulator movement a decade earlier. News of 
Greene's return to North Carolina renewed Cornwallis' hope 
for drawing the Quaker general into open combat, something 
that might boost the sagging morale of area Loyalists. 
Tarleton later criticized the abandonment of Hillsborough, 
claiming that Cornwallis "relinquished his claim to the 
superiority of British a r m s " . 58 Blunder or not, the Earl 
now faced a more formidable enemy, for Greene's army
75
numbered nearly 4,300 after reinforcements of several 
thousand militia. On March 15, Greene and Cornwallis' army 
of two thousand regulars collided at Guilford Court House 
for ninety minutes. The British army held the field but 
suffered ninety-three killed, 413 wounded and twenty-six 
missing, an appalling twenty-seven percent casualty 
r a t e . 59 Charles James Fox, a member of parliament's 
anti-war minority, later exclaimed: "Another such victory 
would ruin the British army".60 What part had North 
Carolina Loyalists played in this showdown? Hamilton's 
Royal North Carolina Regiment, consisting of 232 men, were 
detached prior to the battle to guard the baggage.61
Cornwallis withdrew southwards and arrived at Cross 
Creek three days after the battle. There he issued another 
proclamation expressing the hope that the Highlanders in 
the area would take up arms for the Crown. They did not, 
even though Tarleton claimed they "retained great zeal" for 
the King. A pardon was offered to Americans who would 
surrender their arms and return to their homes peaceably, 
but this had little e f f e c t . 62 Earlier at Bell's Mill on 
Deep River, the only Loyalists that did come into camp 
exasperated Cornwallis: "Many shook me by the hand, said 
they were glad to see us, and to hear we had beat Greene, 
and then rode home again; for I could not get 100 men in 
all the Regulator Country to stay with us, even as 
M i l i t i a " . 63 vf a y  would anyone join a tattered army
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continually on the move, an army that ground Indian corn 
with canteens to make bread, feasted on turnips for dinner, 
and whose numbers had been reduced from 3,224 regulars on 
January 15 to 1,723 fit for duty on April 1?64
With a third of his army sick or wounded, the 
remainder "without Shoes and worn down with fatigue," and 
only four days forage within twenty miles of 
smallpox-infested Cross Creek, Cornwallis immediately moved 
down the Cape Fear River to Wilmington. It was "totally 
impracticable" to establish a supply route up the river 
because its innumerable twists and turns made it vulnerable 
to attack. Bladen County militia leader Alexander 
Lillington of Moore's Creek fame once again defended his 
homeland and harassed the enemy. Cornwallis limped into 
Wilmington on April 7 and was greeted by Major James Craig, 
who had established a British post there with 450 regulars 
in January. General Greene stopped his pursuit and turned 
towards the weakened posts in South Carolina.65 Cornwallis 
would not follow. Writing to Lord Germain, Cornwallis 
attempted to justify his abandonment of South Carolina. 
The distance to Camden, the lack of forage and subsistence 
on the road there, the difficulty of crossing the Pedee 
River when opposed by numerous rebels, and the inability of 
his force to resume an offensive posture were the stated 
reasons.66
The grand plan to restore the south lay in ruins. The
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Cross Creek proclamation would be the last serious attempt 
to rally American Loyalists. Cornwallis now looked to 
Virginia: "Until Virginia is in a manner subdued, our hold
of the Carolinas must be difficult, if not precarious". He 
claimed that it was the only province where offensive 
operations were possible.67 True to his plan, by the end 
of April, Cornwallis marched into Virginia with hopes of 
uniting with General Phillips. Historian Thomas Baker 
claimed that this move was "unquestionably the greatest 
mistake of his long and distinguished military career". 
Clinton later insisted that if he had been aware of 
Cornwallis’ intentions, he would have prevented the move 
into Virginia.68
In retrospect, Cornwallis never gave the North 
Carolina Loyalists the opportunity to rally. He never 
controlled areas of the state for more than a few weeks at 
a time and made no attempt to restore a temporary 
government. Yet he complained that Loyalists' "friendship 
was only passive," and that he was without "one active or 
useful friend" throughout the entire campaign.69 He also 
blamed the geography of the state, which lacked interior 
navigation and was called by one British general the "most 
barren inhospitable, unhealthy part of North America".70 
Unfortunately for North Carolinians, Cornwallis' legacy was 
a vicious civil war that raged until 1782.
Even with Cornwallis' departure from the state in
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April, Loyalists were emboldened by the British haven at 
Wilmington. The assembled in Duplin, Cumberland, Bladen 
and Anson counties. Effectively snuffing out Whig attempts 
to organize, Major Craig supplied ammunition and arms to 
Tories.71. Several patriot leaders were captured, including 
Cornelius Harnett and General John Ashe. Samuel Johnston, 
a North Carolina delegate to the Continental Congress, 
declined the honorable position of President of Congress in 
July to return to his family, who had fled from their home 
in Edenton.72 Few families escaped the turmoil.
Whig leaders grew uneasy. Statesman William Hooper 
warned Attorney General James Iredell that Major Craig 
proposed to "carry havoc and devastation amongst the 
rebels". Iredell wrote in September that although the 
"reign of the Tories" would soon be over, he always 
travelled with an escort of at least twenty-five men. A 
friend of Iredell living in the Deep River area reported 
"Banditry" plundering inhabitants of furniture and 
h o r s e s . F e a r f u l  Whigs knew the key figure leading the 
loyal opposition: David Fanning.
Fanning's assertion that much of North Carolina 
remained under British control long after Major Craig's 
evacuation of Wilmington appears to be true. An active 
Loyalist since May 1775, the ruthless Fanning led Tory 
units in the Carolinas, Georgia and East Florida. Major 
Craig commissioned him colonel in July 1781. In his
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memorial after the war, Fanning claims to have led as many 
as 950 men in thirty-six skirmishes in North Carolina. He 
lured men into arms with a bounty of three guineas, free 
grants of land, and promised new recruits clothing, pay, 
provisions and "all the advantages of his Majesty's Regular 
and Provincial Troops". His surprise night raids and
ambushes, covering remote terrain, kept the rebels
bewildered.
Fanning's most brillant exploit was the capture of 
North Carolina's Whig Governor, Thomas Burke, on September 
13. Burke was held hostage by Major Craig for the safety 
of Fanning and was denied the right of exchange. Burke 
eventually broke his parole in Charleston and escaped in 
January 1782.75 Only the evacuation of Wilmington in
November 1781 and the departure of Fanning in May 1782 
ended the fighting.76 One shudders to imagine the outcome 
if Cornwallis' army had occupied North Carolina for an 
extended period of time.
The Earl was well aware that abandoning the Carolinas 
and invading Virginia was a "hazardous enterprise". Such a 
drastic move was clear evidence that he had discarded
Britain's policy of utilizing Loyalists to pacify the 
South.77 In fact, when Clinton later urged him to conduct 
a similar campaign in conjunction with the Tories in 
Pennsylvania and Maryland, Cornwallis rejected it.^8 Lack 
of cooperation between Cornwallis and Clinton in the summer
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and fall of 1781 led directly to the checkmate of 
Cornwallis' army at Yorktown in October 1781 and an end to 
the American Revolution.79 Cornwallis’ ultimate rejection 
of the North Carolina Loyalists and his fruitless invasion 
of their state in 1781 are unjust memorials to the 
widespread Tory movement that began on a raw February 
morning at Moore's Creek Bridge in 1776.
EPILOGUE
Those people have been induced to brave every danger 
and difficulty during the late war rather than render 
any service to the rebels, had their properties real 
and personal taken to support their enemies, the 
fatherless and widows stripped, and every manner of 
support taken from them, . . . and no resting place 
could be found for them.°0
In this statement, David Fanning reminds the historian 
that the hardships of the Loyalists spanned beyond the 
eight years of the Revolutionary War. Approximately one 
thousand provincials and militia left Wilmington with the 
British in 1781, and more were to follow the exodus. 
Hundreds took refuge in Britain, the West Indies, Canada, 
East Florida and the Bahama Islands. Some remained. John 
Pyle, a veteran of Moore's Creek and "Pyle's Massacre," was 
found not guilty of treason in November 1782 and quietly 
returned to Chatham County.81 David Fanning, however, fled 
from the Carolinas to Florida, the Bahamas, and finally to 
Nova Scotia in 1784. The British Claims Commission awarded 
him an insultingly small sum o f ^60 for his services. 
North Carolina did not ratify the 1783 Treaty of Paris 
until 1787, for in it were provisions giving Loyalists 
property rights. Sale of Tory properties went on until
81
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1790. Bitterness and resentment flared for the rest of the 
century and beyond.82
During the war, success eluded the North Carolina 
Loyalists primarily because they were outnumbered. There 
were not enough loyal citizens to "Americanize" the war, 
and too many rebels over a remote and inhospitable terrain 
to subdue.83 xhe "middling" numbers of Tories in North 
Carolina suffered a drastic attrition rate, so that by 1781 
their manpower and resources were stretched thin. Hundreds 
were killed in battles and skirmishes, others fled from 
drafts, oaths and confiscation, while hundreds of others 
fought for the King in South Carolina and Georgia. No 
notable Tory leaders would emerge, except for Fanning and 
Hamilton. 84-
In addition to the manpower shortage, the inherent 
mental attitude of Loyalists everywhere presented a 
dilemma. By nature, the conservative Loyalists, attempting 
to preserve the status quo, generally declared and 
organized themselves later than the Whigs. They were 
vulnerable to persecution and initial military setbacks. 
Their goals remained muddled and offered no catchy slogans, 
putting them at a disadvantage in a revolutionary milieu. 
Promise of British support only increased the tendency of 
the Tories to rely heavily on the supposed invincibility of 
the redcoats. In not a single province were the Whigs
ousted by unaided L o y a l i s t s . 85
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Rebel leaders in North Carolina took advantage oftheir 
own numerical superiority and the Loyalists lackluster 
organization and suppressed initial Loyalists hopes at the 
Battle of Moore's Creek Bridge. During the four years that 
followed, the Whigs established a militia structure that 
provided a legendary partisan resistance to British 
authority.86 At the same time, an effective Whig 
government took harsh but necessary measures to bring order 
and stability to the state. The "daring, constancy and 
fortitude" of Whig leaders alleviated many excesses of the 
Whig militia. Finally, the American Southern Department 
was blessed during the 1781 invasion with the leadership of 
Nathanael Greene, called by one of his contemporaries as 
"the greatest military genius" produced by the Revolution.87
Did the British ever have a realistic chance of 
utilizing Loyalists successfully? Perhaps if the British 
had given massive support from the start, and had been 
blessed with methodical and charismatic leaders who 
solidified gains and pacified regions through political and 
social reforms before gobbling up more territory, the 
strategy might have worked. Instead, the Loyalists did not 
become the linchpin of British strategy until 1779, a 
strategy of necessity that was pursued i n t e r m i t t e n t l y .88 
Britain asked the Loyalists to do too much too late in the 
war.89
By the 1781 invasion of North Carolina, the chasm
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between the strategy from Whitehall and the military 
realities in the south created a breakdown in command. 
Clinton was operating under something similar to nervous 
exhaustion and was preoccupied with a desire to resign. 
Cornwallis literally fought an independent war in the 
Carolines and never gave Loyalists a fair trial. In the 
end, he expected them to become an offensive force.90 
Sadly, Cornwallis' invasion left behind "a melancholy camp 
encumbered with a long train of sick and wounded," a 
campaign conducted without the "smallest military merit," 
and the insulting expectation that the North Carolina 
Loyalists would fail him.91
The Crown supporters in North Carolina lost the 
struggle over home rule. Their accomplishments are often 
overshadowed by the inherent lawlessness of the 
revolutionary period, where countless citizens were neither 
Tory nor Whig at heart, and were plundered and terrorized 
by both sides at will.92 T h e  loyal Americans served as 
scouts, spies, messengers, guides and waggoners. They 
disrupted local recruiting, fought in crucial battles, 
waylaid supply trains, and captured the state's governor 
during a brutal civil w a r . 93 Those who are quick to point 
to the Loyalists' misdeeds overlook their courage. As one 
Whig leader remarked after the war, "no man in a civil war 
is justly censurable for anything but insincerity in 
choosing his side, or infidelity in adhering to it".94
85
Notes for Chapter III
^Don Higginbotham, The War of American Independence 
(New York: The Macmillan C o ~  1971), pp. 352-354; Paul HT 
Smith, Loyalists and Redcoats (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1964), pp. 78-81; Earl Cornwallis to 
Sir Henry Clinton, June 30, 1780, in Walter Clark, ed., The 
State Records of North Carolina, 16 vols,, numbered 11-26 
(Winston and Goldsboro, 1895-1907), 14: 866. (hereafter
cited as Clark, ed., State Records) .
^Smith, Loyalists, pp. 96-99; Higginbotham, American 
Independence, pp. 353-354; "Journal From London (Most
Secret)," July 26, 1778, cited in John Shy, "British 
Strategy for Pacifying the Southern Colonies, 1778-1781," 
in The Southern Experience in the American Revolution, eds. 
Jeffrey J4 Crow and Larry E. Tise (Chapel Hill: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 1978), p. 156.
^Shy, "British Strategy," in Crow and Tise, eds., The 
Southern Experience, p. 159.
^Smith, Loyalists, pp. 89,93; Clinton essentially 
adopted Kirkland's plan. See Randall M. Miller, "A 
Backcountry Loyalist Plan to Retake Georgia and the 
Carolinas, 1778," South Carolina Historical Magazine 75 
(1974): 207-215.
^Higginbotham, American Independence, p. 354; Smith, 
Loyalists pp. 100,126.
^Willard Wallace, Appeal to Arms (New York: Harper
and Brothers Publishers, 1951), pp. 204-209; Higginbotham, 
American Independence pp. 352-355.
^Wendell H. Stephenson and E. Merton Coulter, eds., A 
History of the South, 10 vols. (Louisiana State University 
Press, 1957), vol. 3T The South in the Revolution, by John 
Alden, p. 235; Loyalist Daniel McNeill had refused the oath 
twice, remained hidden in North Carolina and Virginia, and 
joined Hamilton's Volunteers in 1778. See Carole W. 
Troxler, The Loyalist Experience in North Carolina 
(Zebulon, NC: Theo. Davis Sons, Inc., 1976), p. 20.
^William Hooper to James Iredell, November 17, 1778, 
in Don Higginbotham, The Papers of James Iredell, 4 vols. 
(Raleigh: North Carolina Division of Archives and History,
1976), 2: 55; Hugh F. Rankin, The North Carolina
86
Continentals (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 1971), p. 232; Robert 0. DeMond, The Loyalists in 
North Carolina During the Revolution (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1940;, pp. 128-129.
^Higginbotham, American Independence, pp. 356-357; 
Wallace, Appeal, pp! 210-211; M.F. Treacy, Prelude to 
Yorktown (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina 
Press, 1963), p. 13.
lOoeMond, Loyalists, p. 124; Rankin, Continentals, p. 
232; Higginbotham, American Independence, p. 357; Smith, 
Loyalists, pp. 135-136.
^-Wallace, Appeal, p. 216.
l^Smith, Loyalists, pp. 133-135; Cornwallis to 
Clinton, June 30, 1780, in Clark, ed., State Records, 14: 
866.
l^Samuel A'Court Ashe, History of North Carolina, 2 
vols. (Greensboro: Charles L. Van Noppen, Pub., 1908) , 2:
614-616; Smith, Loyalists, p. 142; Cornwallis to Clinton, 
June 30, 1780, in Clark, ed., State Records, 14: 866-867;
David Schenck, North Carolina, 1780-1781 XRaleigh: Edwards 
and Broughton, Pubs., 1889) , pp. 57-63; For an eyewitness 
account, see Blackwell P. Robinson, The Revolutionary 
Sketches of William R. Davie (Raleigh: North Carolina
Division o£ Archives and History, 1976), pp. 5-8.
i4fianastre Tarleton, A History of the Campaigns of 
1780 and 1781 in the Southern~Provinces of North America 
(London: T. Cadell, 1787; reprint ed., Spartanburg, SCI The
Reprint Co., 1967), pp. 91-92; Smith, Loyalists, pp. 
142-143; Ashe, North Carolina, 2: 615-616.
i^Smith, Loyalists, p. 144; Ashe, North Carolina, 2: 
616. Robinson, Revolutionary Sketches, pp. 11-16;
Cornwallis claimed that only two thirds of Bryan's force 
was armed. See Cornwallis to Clinton, July 14, 1780, in 
Clark, ed., State Records, 14: 867-868.
^Higginbotham, American Independence, pp. 357-360; 
Ashe, North Carolina, 21 618-622.
i7cornwallis to Clinton, Aug. 6, 1780, in Appendix of
Sir Henry Clinton, The American Rebellion, William B. 
Willcox, ed. (New Haven! Yale University Press, 1954), p. 
448; Franklin and Mary Wickwire, Cornwallis: The American 
Adventure (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1970), pT 187.
87
-^Clinton, Rebellion, pp. 186-187; Smith, Loyalists, 
pp. 133-134.
Cornwallis to Clinton, Aug. 29, 1780, as quoted in 
Smith, Loyalists, p. 146.
2°Cornwallis to Clinton, Aug. 6, 1780, in Appendix, 
Clinton, Rebellion, p. 448.
21v/allace, Appeal, p. 211; Higginbotham, American 
Independence, pp. 361-362; Tarleton, Southern Provinces, 
pp. 28-32.
^Higginbotham, American Independence, p. 361. Hugh 
F. Rankin, Francis Marion: The Swamp Fox (New York: Thomas
Crowell C o ~  1973) , p"! 181; On tne day of the Battle of
Camden, Sumter attacked a British supply train and captured 
100 British regulars, 50 Loyalists, and 42 wagons.
2 ^ R a n k i n ,  Swamp Fox, pp. 100, 110, 298-299; Rankin, 
Continentals, p . 291.
24-Troxler, Loyalists, p.22; Ashe, North Carolina, 2: 
645; Plantation burnings were "uniformly enacted'’ by the 
British in the South. See Robinson, Revolutionary Sketches, 
p . 23.
^ T r o x l e r ,  Loyalists, pp. 140-142; Rankin, Swamp Fox, 
pp. 73-74.
^ W i c k w i r e ,  American Adventure, pp. 182-183; Smith, 
Loyalists, pp. 131-133; Tarleton, Southern Provinces, pp. 
7"3-7I>.---
2?Henry Lee, Memoirs of the War in the Southern 
Department of the United States (New York: University 
Publishing Co. , 1869) , 193; Clinton based much of his
decision on a report from James Simpson, former Attorney 
General of South Carolina, who reported that most Loyalist 
leaders were demoralized and wanted guilty Whigs punished. 
See Shy, "British Strategy", Crow and Tise, eds., Southern 
Experience, pp.166-167.
^^Tarleton, Southern Provinces, pp. 156-157; 
Higginbotham, American Independence, p. 363.
29cornwallis to Clinton, Aug. 6, 1780, in Clinton, 
Rebellion, p. 449; Smith, Loyalists, p. 146.
30 Ashe, North Carolina, 2: 618.
88
31-Ibid. , 2: 626-628; Rankin, Continentals, pp.
245-247; Jeffrey J. Crow, A Chronicle of North Carolina 
During the American Revolution (Raleigh: North Carolina 
Division of Archives and History, 1975), p. 41.
^^Xarleton, Southern Provinces, p. 160; Jethro Sumner
was in command of the Whig militia of the Hillsborough
District. See Rankin, Continentals, p. 247.
^^Tarleton, Southern Provinces, p. 160.
3^Robinson, Revo1u t io nary Ske t che s, pp. 21-26;
Rankin, Continentals^ pp. 249-250; Ashe, North Carolina, 2:
629-631.
^DeMond, Loyalists, pp. 129-130; Higginbotham, 
American Independence, p. 363; Ashe, North Carolina, 2: 632.
36james Iredell to Hannah Iredell, Oct. 8, 1780, in 
Higginbotham, ed., Iredell, 2: 175.
37oeMond, Loyalists, pp. 131-133;. Ashe, North 
Carolina, 2: 633-635; Higginbotham, American Independence, 
p"I 364; Smith, Loyalists, p. 148; American forces suffered 
ninety casualties. See Henry Lumpkin, From Savannah to 
Yorktown (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 
1981), Appendix, p. 293.
^ H i g g i n b o t h a m ,  American Independence, p. 364; 
DeMond, Loyalists, p. 132.
^ C o r n w a l l i s  to General Smallwood, Nov. 10, 1780, in 
Clark, ed., State Records, 14: 733. For a description of 
the brutal treatment of prisoners, see Wickwire, American 
Adventure, pp. 217-219.
^Ashe, North Carolina, 2: 636; DeMond, Loyalists, p.
134.
4-lColonel Davie to General Sumner, Oct. 15, 1780, in 
Clark, ed., State Records, 14: 789-790.
^ Lord Rawdon to Clinton, Oct. 29, 1780, as quoted in 
Smith, Loyalists, pp. 148-149; Robinson, Revolutionary 
Sketches, pp. 26-28; Tarleton, Southern Provinces, pp. 
166-167; Reasons for the sucess of the Whig militia can be 
found in Robert C. Pugh, "The Revolutionary Militia in the 
Southern Campaign, 1780-1781," William and Mary Quarterly 
14(1957): 166-167; Rankin, Continentals, pp. 250-251.
^ C l i n t o n ,  Rebellion, p. 228; Sir Henry Clinton,
89
Observations on Earl Cornwallis' Answer (London: J. 
Debrett, I7B31 reprint ed., Philadelphia: Henry B. Ashmead, 
1866), pp. 6-7.
44-Tarleton, Southern Provinces, p. 168.
^ C o r n w a l l i s  to Clinton, Jan. 6, 1781, Cornwallis to 
Lord Germain, March 17, 1781, in Clark, ed., State Records, 
17: 979, 996; Smith, Loyalists, pp. 149-1501 Historian
Clyde Ferguson believed Cornwallis was "partially 
justified" for invading North Carolina, because the South 
Carolina resistance "fed on the North Carolina sanctuary". 
See Clyde R. Ferguson, "Carolina and Georgia Patriot and 
Loyalist Militia in Action, 1778-1783," in Crow and Tise, 
eds., Southern Experience, p. 187.
^^Smallwood to Gates, Oct. 27, 1780, in Clark, ed., 
State Records, 14: 712; Loyalist militia were oftentimes 
seen as little better than rebels, especially in their 
treatment as prisoners of war. See Troxler, Loyalists, p. 
26.
^Cornwallis to Clinton, Jan. 6, 1781, as quoted in 
Smith, Loyalists, p. 150; Ashe, North Carolina, 2: 666;
Cornwallis was also determined to recruit Loyalists. See 
Cornwallis to Clinton, Jan. 18, 1781, in Clark, ed., State 
Records, 17: 981-982.
^ B r i g . Gen. Charles O'Hara to the Duke of Grafton, 
April 20, 1781, as quoted in Wickwire, American Adventure, 
Preface; Tarleton, Southern Provinces, p. 22l; Between one 
hundred and 150 Loyalist militia took part in the battle. 
See Lumpkin, Savannah, p. 295; For the impact of the battle 
see DeMond, Loyalists, pp. 134-135; Higginbotham, American 
Independence^ pp. T67-368; Rankin, Continentals, p . 272;
Don Higginbotham, Daniel Morgan: Revolutionary Rifleman
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1961),
pp. 154-155.
49whig militia had been raised with offers of a 
jf2,000 bonus, a prime slave, and 640 acres of land. See 
Ashe, North Carolina, p. 643.
S^Tarleton admitted that the retreat was "judiciously 
designed and vigorously executed". See Tarleton, Southern 
Provinces, p.229; Hugh F. Rankin, Greene and Cornwallis: 
The Campaign in the Carolinas (Raleigh^ Division o£ 
Archives and History, 1976) , pp. 40-56; Ashe, North 
Carolina, 2: 653-655; George W. Kyte, "Victory in the
South: An Appraisal of General Greene's Strategy in the 
Carolinas," North Carolina Historical Review 37(1960):
90
330-331; Greene's biographer, Theodore Thayer, called the 
retreat "masterful". See Theodore Thayer, Nathanael Greene: 
Strategist of the American Revolution (New York: Twayne
Publishers, 1960) , pp. 310-319, 283.
■^Jeffrey J. Crow, The Black Experience in 
Revolutionary North Carolina"  ^ 2nd ed. (Raleigh: Division of 
Archives and History, 1983), p . 75; Crow claimed that the 
British Army attracted Negroes "like a magnet". Loyalists 
sold property certificates at an extreme discount. See 
Wickwire, American Adventure, pp. 232, 236.
^Betharbara Diary, Feb. 10, 1781 in Adelaide L. 
Fries, ed., Records of the Moravians in North Carolina, 10 
vols. (Raleigh: Edwards and Broughton Co., 1926) , 4: 1742; 
The Brethren who met Cornwallis described him as "friendly" 
and "satisfied".
^Clinton, Rebellion> p. 264.
54xarl eton, Southern Provinces, p. 231.
^Historian Jeffrey Crow claimed that Whig authority 
crumbled with the British invasion. See Jeffrey J. Crow, 
"Liberty Men and Loyalists: Disorder and Disaffection in 
the North Carolina Backcountry," in An Uncivil War: The
Southern Backcountry During the American Revolution, eds. 
Ronald Ho f fman, Thad Tate and Peter JT Albert 
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1985), p.
159; See "Cornwallis' Proclamation" in Clark, ed., State 
Records, 17: 986-987; Lee, Memoirs, p. 263; Col. David
Fanning, Fanning's Narrative, with an Introduction by A. W. 
Savary (Toronto: Reprinted from The Canadian Magazine, 
1908) p. 15.
56t.ee, Memoirs, pp. 256-259; DeMond, Loyalists, p.
136.
5?Tarleton, Southern Provinces, pp. 231-233; Ashe, 
North Carolina, 2: 656-657; Rankin, Greene, p. 63; DeMond, 
Loyalists, pp. 135-136; Smith, Loyalists, p . 152.
58cornwallis to Germain, March 17, 1781, in Clark, 
ed., State Records, 17: 1006; Tarleton, Southern Provinces, 
p. 234; Lee, Memoirs, p. 263; Treacy, Prelude, pp. 15/, 163.
5 9 C o r n w a l l i s  to Germain, March 17, 1781, in Clark, 
ed., State Records, 17: 1002-1007; Thomas E. Baker, Another 
Such Victory (New York: Eastern Acorn Press, 1981), pp. 
50-78; Ashe, North Carolina, 2: 658-661; Lumpkin, Savannah, 
pp. 296-298.
91
6^As quoted in Baker, Another Victory, p. 78; 
Historian David Schenck believed that "the day itself has 
not yet obtained its proper place in American history" See 
Schenck, North Carolina:1780-1781, p. 387.
6lLumpkin, Savannah, pp. 296-298.
62See ’’Cornwallis1 Proclamation" in Clark, ed., State 
Records, 17: 1007-1008; Tarleton, Southern Provinces^
pp.312-313, 279, 281.
6 3 C o r n w a l l i s  to Clinton, April 10, 1781, in Clark, 
ed., State Records, 17: 1011; Ashe, North Carolina, 2:
661-662^
64"state of the Troops that Marched with the Army 
Under the Command of Lt. Gen. Earl Cornwallis" in Clark, 
ed., State Records, 17: 1009; Clinton, Rebellion, p. 264; 
Rankin, Continentals, p. 313.
^ C o r n w a l l i s  to Clinton, April 10, 1781, in Clark,
ed., State Records, 17: 1010-1011; Ashe, North Carolina, 2: 
655; Baker, Another Victory, p. 83; Rankin, Greene, pp. 
81-82; Tarleton^ Southern Provinces, p. 281; Kyte, "’Victory 
in the South," NCHR 37(1960): 335.
^ C o r n w a l l i s  to Germain, April 23, 1781, in Clark, 
ed., State Records, 17: 1017; Cornwallis to Clinton, May 
26, 1781, in Clinton, Rebellion, p. 523.
^ C o r n w a l l i s  to Clinton, April 10, 1781, in Clark,
e d ., State Records, 17: 1012; Smith, Loyalists, p. 153.
^Clinton to Cornwallis, May 29, 1781, in Clark, ed., 
State Records, 17: 1036; Baker, Another Victory, p. 85.
^ C o r n w a l l i s  to Germain, April 18, 1781, Cornwallis
to Clinton, April 23, 1781, in Clark, ed., State Records, 
17: 1016, 1018; Smith, Loyalists, p. 155.
^Brig. Gen. Charles O'Hara to the Duke of Grafton, 
April 20, 1781, as quoted in Wickwire, American Adventure, 
Preface; Higginbotham, American Independence, p. T7TTi
7^-DeMond, Loyalists, p. 139; Ashe, North Carolina, 2: 
676; Control of the supply of arms was crucial. See Crow, 
"Liberty Men," in Hoffman, Tate and Albert, eds., An 
Uncivil War, pp. 160, 165-166; Fanning had some
difficulties arming Loyalists. See Fanning, Narrative, p. 
18.
92
72DeMond, Loyalists, pp. 138-139; Ashe, North 
Carolina, 2: 647.
^^William Hooper to James Iredell, July 3, 1781,
James Iredell to Hannah Iredell, September 3, 1781, John 
Williams to James Iredell, Oct. 6, 1781, in Higginbotham, 
ed., Iredell, 2: 264, 288, 306.
^Fanning, Narrative, pp. 18-20; DeMond, Loyalists, 
pp. 141-147; At least on paper, Fanning prohibited 
plundering and "all irregularities and disorders".
Spanning, Narrative, pp. 23-24; For an analysis of 
Burke's subsequent fall from power, see John S. Watterson 
III, "The Ordeal of Governor Burke," North Carolina 
Historical Review 48(1971): 105-117; Ashe, North Carolina, 
21 696; Troxler, Loyalists, p. 26.
Spanning, Narrative, pp. 14-25; On one occasion, 
Fanning hung two deserters from Hamilton's regiment "both 
on the limb of one tree" to revenge the murder of a 
friend. See Fanning, Narrative, p. 30.
77Smith, Loyalists, pp. 156-157.
7®Clinton to Phillips, April 26, 1781, in Clark, ed., 
State Records, 17: 1022.
79smith, Loyalists, pp. 158-159.
^Fanning, Narrative, pp. 18-19.
81-Troxler, Loyalists, pp. 28-29, 38, 57; The Williams 
family of Anson County fled after the Moore's Creek Bridge 
Campaign to Georgia, then East Florida. After the war, 
members of the family were in New Brunswick, the Bahamas, 
North Carolina and London.
S^Crow, "Liberty Men," in Hoffman, Tate and Albert, 
eds., An Uncivil War, pp. 175-178; Clark, ed., State 
Record" °1 ' ~ ~ ~ J T ~lists, pp. 152, 168; Alden,
S ^ F e r g u s o n ,  "Patriot and Loyalist Militia," in Crow 
and Tise, eds., Southern Experience, p. 193; Ira D. Gruber, 
"Britain's Southern Strategy/' in The Revolutionary War in 
the South: Power, Conflict and Leadership, e d . by W . Robert 
Higgins (Durham: Duke University Press, 1T979) , p. 237; Shy, 
"British Strategy," in Crow and Tise, eds. Southern 
Experience, p. 155; Isaac Harrell, "North Carolina 
Loyalists," North Carolina Historical Review 3(1926): 590.
South Crow, Chronicle, p. 51.
93
Paul Smith estimated that twenty percent of white Americans 
were "Loyalists". See Paul H. Smith, "The American 
Loyalists: Notes on their Organization and Numerical 
Strength," William and Mary Quarterly 25(1968): 269; For 
problems with using the claims in determining the social 
and economic status of the claimants, see Eugene R. 
Fingerhut, "Uses and Abuses of the American Loyalists' 
Claims: A Critique of Quantitative Analyses," WMQ 25(1968):
246.
84-Gov. Martin to Germain, Sept. 5, 1777, Gov. Martin 
to Germain, Nov. 11, 1776, in Clark, ed., State Records, 
11: 765, 10: 899; Wickwire, American Adventure, p. 185; 
Wallace Brown, The Good Americans (New York: William Morrow 
and Co., Inc., 1969) , pp, 81, 236.
85gr0wn, Good Americans, pp. 112, 122-123; Wickwire, 
American Adventure* P* ^5.
86For comparison with other wars, see Russell F. 
Weigley, The Partisan War: The South Carolina Campaign of 
1780-1782 (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press,
1970), pp. 1-5; Higginbotham, American Independence, p. 
371. For the effectiveness o"E the Whig militia, see 
Ferguson, "Functions of the Partisan-Militia in the South 
During the American Revolution: An Interpretation," in 
Higgins, ed., Power, Conflict and Leadership, pp. 240-241; 
Pugh, "Revolutionary Militia," in WMQ 14(1957): 175.
87perguson, "Patriot and Loyalist Militia," in Crow 
and Tise, eds., Southern Experience, p. 175; Clark, ed., 
State Records, 11: xvii; Thayer, Greene, p. 446.
88cruber, "Southern Strategy," in Higgins, ed., 
Power, Conflict and Leadership, p. 238. Higginbotham 
suggested that Sir William Howe might have performed well 
in the South. See Higginbotham, American Independence, p. 
371; Clyde Ferguson claimed that the British lost the 
southern campaign as early as the Fall of 1776 because of 
their failure to support the Tories from the start. See 
Ferguson, "Partisan Militia," in Higgins, ed., Power, 
Conflict and Leadership, p. 258.
89smith, Loyalists, p. 173.
^Higginbotham, American Independence, p. 377; Smith, 
Loyalists, pp. 156-157; Clinton, Rebellion, pp. xxxv, xxxix.
91Cornwallis to Phillips, April 10, 1781, as quoted 
in Treacy, Prelude, p. 12; Clinton, Observations, p. 10.
94
92(]row, "Liberty Men," in Hoffman, Tate and Albert, 
eds., An Uncivil War, p. 162; Wallace Brown claimed that a 
British victory would have created an "enormous Ireland". 
See Brown, Good Americans, p. 254; Harrell, "Loyalists," 
NCHR 3(1926): 577-579; Alden, South in the Revolution, pp. 
T W = 2 0 0 . -----------------------
93]3rown, Good Americans, pp. 97-98; Troxler, 
Loyalists, p. 26; William H. Nelson, The American Tory 
(Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1961) , ~p~. 190 and Preface;
Nelson claims much of America's European Conservative 
philosophy was lost during the Loyalist diaspora.
94james Iredell to A. Neilson, June 15, 1784, as 
quoted in Harrell, "Loyalists," NCHR 3(1926): 575.
95
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Primary Sources
Boyd, William K., ed. Some Eighteenth Century Tracts 
Concerning North Carolina! Raleigh: Edwards and 
Broughton Co., 1927.
Bute Committee of Safety Minutes. Warrenton: Warren County 
Bicentennial Committee, 1977.
Clark, Walter C., ed. The State Records of North
Carolina. Vols. 10,11,12,14,15,17,24. Winston 
and Goldsboro, NC, 1895-1914.
Clinton, Sir Henry. The American Rebellion. Edited by
William B. Willcox. New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1954.
________ . Observations on Earl Cornwallis'
AnswerI London: Jl Debrett, 1783; reprint ed., 
Philadelphia: Henry B. Ashmead, 1866.
Criminal Action Papers, Salisbury District Superior Court, 
1778-1779. Raleigh: North Carolina Division of 
Archives and History.
Fanning, Col. David. Fanning's Narrative. Introduction by 
A. W. Savary. Toronto: Reprinted from the Canadian 
Magazine, 1908.
Fries, Adelaide, ed. Records of the Moravians in North
Carolina. Vols. 3,4. Raleigh: Edwards and Broughton 
Co. , 1926.
Higginbotham, Don, ed. The Papers of James Iredell.
Vols. 1,2. Raleigh! North Carolina Division of
96
Archives and History, 1976.
The Journal of the Proceedings of the Provincial Congress 
of North Carolina, Nov. 12, 1776. Westport, CT: 
Greenwood Publishing Co., MF 362.
McEachern, Leora H . , and Williams, Isabel M., eds.
Wilmington-New Hanover Safety Committee Minutes. 
Wilmington: Wilmington-New Hanover County Bicentennial 
Committee, 1974.
Moore, Frank, ed. Diary of the American Revolution from
Newspapers and Original Documents. 2 vo1s . New York:
Charles Scribner, 1863.
North Carolina General Assembly Session Records, Box 1, 
1780. Raleigh: North Carolina Division of Archives 
and History.
Schaw, Janet. Journal of a Lady of Quality. Edited by
Evangeline W. and Charles M. Andrews. New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1939.
Secretary of State Papers, including Provincial Congresses 
and Conventions, 1775-1780. Raleigh: North Carolina 
Division of Archives and History.
Stedman, Charles. The History of the Origins, Progress and 
Termination of the American War. Vol. 1, London: nl
p.," 1755:
Tarleton, Banastre. A History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 
1781 in the Southern Provinces of North America. 
London: T. Cadell, 1787; reprint ed., Spartanburg, SC: 
The Reprint Co., 1967.
Secondary Sources
Albert Peter J .; Hoffman, Ronald; and Tate, Thad, eds. An 
Uncivil War: The Southern Backcountry During the
97
American Revolution. Charlottesville: University 
Press of Virginia, 1985.
Ashe, Samuel A'Court. History of North Carolina. Vol. 2. 
Greensboro: Charles L. Van Noppen, Pub., 1908.
Baker, Thomas E. Another Such Victory. New York: Eastern 
Acorn Press, 1981.
Brown, Wallace. The Good Americans. New York: William 
Morrow and Co"! Inc . , 1969.
Calhoon, Robert M. The Loyalists in Revolutionary America, 
1760-1781. New York: Harcourt Jovanovich, Inc., 1973.
Carruthers, Rev. E. Washington. Interesting Revolutionary 
Incidents and Sketches of Characters, Chiefly in the 
Old North State. Philadelphia: Hayes and Zell, 1854.
Coulter, E. Merton, and Stephenson, Wendell H., eds. 
History of the South. 10 Vols. Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1957. Vol. 3: The 
South in the Revolution, by John Richard Alden.
Crow, Jeffrey J. The Black Experience in Revolutionary 
North Carolina"! 2nd edition. Raleigh: Division of 
Archives and History, 1983.
 . A Chronicle of North Carolina During the
American Revolution! Raleigh: North Carolina Division 
o£ Archives and History, 1975.
"Tory Plots and Anglican Loyalty: The Llewelyn 
Conspiracy of 1777." North Carolina Historical Review 
55 (1978).
Crow, Jeffrey J., and Tise, Larry E., eds. The Southern 
Experience in the American Revolution. Chapel HillT: 
The University of North Carolina Press, 1978.
98
DeMond, Robert 0. The Loyalists in North Carolina During 
the Revolution" Durham: Duke University Press, 1940.
Ekirch, A. Roger. "Poor Carolina11: Politics and Society in 
Colonial North Carolina, 1729-1776. Chapel Hill: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 1981.
Farnham, Thomas J.; Huhta, James K.; and Powell, William 
S., eds. The Regulators in North Carolina: A 
Documentary History, 1 7 5 9 - 1 7 7 5 " ; Raleigh: State Dept, 
oi Archives and History, 1 9 7 1 .
Fingerhut, Eugene R. "Uses and Abuses of the American 
Loyalists' Claims: A Critique of Quantitative 
Analysis." William and Mary Quarterly 25 (1968).
Foote, William H. Sketches of North Carolina, Historical 
and Biographical. New York: Robert Carter, 1846.
Graham, Ian Charles C. Colonists from Scotland: Emigration 
to North America, 1707-1783. Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1956.
Griffin, Clarence W. History of Old Tryon and Rutherford 
Counties. Asheville, NC: Miller Printing Co., 1937.
Harrell, Isaac. "North Carolina Loyalists." North Carolina 
Historical Review 3 (1926).
Higginbotham, Don. The War of American Independence. New 
York: The Macmillan Co., 1971.
Higgins, W. Robert, ed. The Revolutionary War in the
South: Power, Conflict and Leadership. Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1979.
Jones, Joseph Seawell. Defense of the Revolutionary
” * ‘ >f the State"of North Carolina. Raleign: n .
99
Kay, L. Michael, and Price, William S., Jr. "To Ride the 
Wood Mare: Road Building and Militia Service in 
Colonial North Carolina, 1740-1775." North Carolina 
Historical Review 57 (1980).
Kyte, George W. "Victory in the South: An Appraisal of 
General Greene's Strategy in the Carolinas." North 
Carolina Historical Review 37 (1960).
Lee, Henry. Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department 
of the United States. New York: University 
Publications Co., TH69.
Lumpkin, Henry. From Savannah to Yorktown. Columbia, SC: 
University of South Carolina Press, T981.
MacLean, J. P. Scotch Highlanders in America. Baltimore: 
Genealogical Pub. CoT, 1968.
Meyer, Duane. The Highland Scots of North Carolina,
1732-1776. Chapel Hill: University of North Caro1ina 
Press, T957.
Miller, Randall M . , ed. "A Backcountry Loyalist Plan to 
Retake Georgia and the Carolinas, 1778." South 
Carolina Historical Magazine 75 (1974).
Nelson, William H. The American Tory. Boston: Beacon Hill 
Press, 1964.
Pugh, Robert C. "The Revolutionary Militia in the Southern 
Campaign, 1780-1781." William and Mary Quarterly 14 
(1957).
Rankin, Hugh F. Francis Marion: The Swamp Fox. New York: 
Thomas Crowell Co., 1973.
Greene and Cornwallis: The Campaign in the 
Carolinas"! RaleTgK! Division of Archives and History,
ITFT.
100
"The Moore's Creek Bridge Campaign, 1776." 
North Carolina Historical Review 23 (1957).
The North Carolina Continentals. Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, T971.
Robinson, Blackwell P., ed. The Revolutionary War Sketches 
of William R. Davie. Raleigh: North Carolina Division 
of Archives and History, 1976.
Schenck, David. North Carolina: 1780-1781. Raleigh: 
Edwards and Broughton, Pubs., 1889.
Smith, Paul H. "The American Loyalists: Notes on Their 
Organization and Numerical Strength." William and 
Mary Quarterly 25 (1968).
 . Loyalists and Redcoats: A Study in British
Revolutionary Policy"! Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1964.
Thayer, Theodore. Nathanael Greene: Strategist of the 
American Revolution. New York: Twayne Publishers,vmz------------------
Treacy, M. F. Prelude to Yorktown: The Southern Campaign 
of Nathanael Greene, 1780-1781. Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1963.
Troxler, Carole W. The Loyalist Experience in North
Carolina. Zebulon, NC: Theo. Davis Sons, Inc., 1976.
Wallace, Willard. Appeal to Arms. New York: Harper and 
Brothers Publishers, 1951.
Watterson, John S. III. "The Ordeal of Governor Burke." 
North Carolina Historical Review 48 (1971).
Weigley, Russell F. The Partisan War: The South Carolina 
Campaign of 1780-1782. Columbia, SC: University of
101
South Carolina Press, 1970.
Wickwire, Franklin and Mary. Cornwallis: The American
Adventure. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1970.
VITA
William Paul Burke
Born in Springfield, Massachusetts, May 26, 1962.
Graduated from Holyoke Catholic High School in Holyoke, 
Massachusetts, May 1980. B.A., Providence College, 1984.
Junior Year Abroad, Universite De Fribourg, Fribourg, 
Switzerland, 1983. M.A. candidate, The College of William 
and Mary, 1983-86, with a concentration in Early American 
History and an apprenticeship in the Historical Archeology 
Program. The course requirements for this degree have been 
completed, but not the thesis: The North Carolina
Loyalists: Faulty Linchpin of a Failed Strategy.
The author has worked at six National Parks as a 
United States National Park Service Ranger, and is 
presently a Supervisory Park Ranger for the Interpretation 
Division of Cape Cod National Seashore.
